Joffre v. Mynatt
Cases that cite this one
15 later published cases cite this decision.
- Schucht v. Stidham (Tex. App. 1930)
- McKeever v. Dittman (Tex. App. 1924)
- Joffre v. Mynatt (Tex. App. 1922)
- M. H. Thomas Co. v. Hawthorne (Tex. App. 1922)
- Knox v. Campbell (Tex. App. 1945)
- Turner v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 1943)
- Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Keahey (Tex. App. 1938)
- Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Wm. Cameron & Co. (Tex. App. 1936)
- Edelbrock v. Farmer (Tex. App. 1931)
- Sigmond Rothschild Co. v. Moore (Tex. App. 1929)
- Texas P. Ry. Co. v. Perkins (Tex. App. 1926)
- Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Perkins (Tex. App. 1926)
- Houston v. Holmes (Tex. App. 1924)
- Blackwell v. Ship Channel Development Co. (Tex. App. 1924)
- Dallas Hotel Co. v. Newberg (Tex. App. 1922)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Suit is by appellee to recover on a note alleged to have been executed by appellant and E. H. Joffre for $1,250 and payable to the order of W. O. Mynatt. A plea of non est factum was interposed by Mrs. Fannie Joffre denying signing said note. E. H. Joffre was alleged to be dead and his estate insolvent. A trial was had before a jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered against Mrs. Fannie Joffre for the amount of the note, from which she appeals.
The only question we will consider is that the great weight and preponderance of the testimony is against the verdict and judgment, and it should be set aside.
“I am a banker at Irving. I know Mrs. Fannie Joffre. • • * * I have been a banker at Irving about nine years. I have to pass on signatures in that bank. Mrs. Joffre has done some business with me, not a groat deal; but she does some. I have had oeeasion to take her signature at the bank, and have had occasion to know it. (Witness was shown the note sued on in this ease.) In my opinion that is not her signature. I see that period after the ‘Fannie’ on that paper. (Witness was shown other signatures.) I do not see any period after the ‘Fannie’ on any of these others.”
Mrs. Joffre had been a patron of the National Bank of Commerce for more than sixteen years and was possessed of considerable property. Some eight witnesses, being banker, merchants, doctor, and business men living in a small town near where Mrs. Joffre lived and where she did business, testified that they “knew the general reputation of Mrs. Fannie Joffre in the community in which she lived for truth and veracity and honesty, and that it was good.” D. B. Eades testified in behalf of appellant in reference to a conversation had with E. H. Joffre and his brother Eric Eades regarding E. H. Joffre having signed his mother’s name to the note in question and about his liability, both civil and criminal.
In the case of Grand Fraternity v. Melton, 102 Tex. 402, 117 S. W. 788, the court said:
“The jury were the judges of the credibility of the witnesses, but they had not the right to arbitrarily reject the evidence of an unimpeached witness against whom there was no discrediting * * * circumstance. * * * The jury were the judges of the weight of the evidence, but they could not lawfully deny proper weight to undisputed facts with no suspicion cast upon them. If the jury had the power to discredit any and every witness and to disregard any and all facts, their verdicts- could not be set aside by the judge nor reviewed by the appellate courts. Yet the law enjoins it upon the courts to set verdicts aside when contrary to the evidence or the law.”
In Hanley v. Gandy, 28 Tex. 211, 91 Am. Dec. 315, in discussing the weight to be given testimony as to the genuineness of signatures by comparison of handwriting, the court quotes from Boman v. Plunkett, 2 McCord (S. C.) 518, as follows:
*953 “I come therefore to the conclusion, as a circumstance in aid of doubtful proof, comparison of handwriting is admissible, but, per se, is so feeble as to be unsafe to act upon; and that, in the absence of any other proof, it would be inadmissible.”
While the verdict of a jury is entitled to great weight when based on evidence reasonably sufficient to sustain it, yet, when it is rendered contrary to the great preponderance and weight of the evidence as adduced in this case, we feel compelled to reverse the judgment and remand the cause for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
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Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.