(after stating the facts as above). [1, 2] In the fourteenth and fifteenth assignments the judgment is attacked as erroneous because, appellant asserts, the testimony did not warrant a finding that the porter was guilty of negligence when he projected his knee over the step box, and because, appellant further asserts, if the testimony did warrant such a finding, it did not warrant a finding in appellees’ favor for as great a sum as . $2,000. The assignments will be overruled. ■ That the jury had a right' to say fro ja the testimony that the porter, owing the duty he did to a passenger, was not without fault in projecting his knee over the step box as he did, is plain, we think. And certainly, if the consequences to Mrs. Courtney of the injury she suffered were as serious as testimony heard on appellees’ behalf indicated they were, the judgment should not be set aside on the ground that it is for an excessive amount.

[3] The contention presented by the first and second assignments is that the trial court erred, in that he failed to submit to the jury an issue as to whether the injury to Mrs. Courtney was the result of an unavoidable accident or not. As we view the testimony, it did not make such an issue. If by the use of care the 'porter could have avoided projecting his knee over the step box (as, plainly, he could), the accident was 'an “avoidable,” and not an “unavoidable” one. As supporting its contention, appellant relies mainly on Railway Co. v. Washington, 94 Tex. 510, 63 S. W. 534. “Clearly,” appellant says, “if the evidence in the Washington Case raised the issue of accident, then the evidence in the case at bar does.” But, as we view them, that case and this one are not at all alike. The testimony in that case, which the court held was sufficient to raise the issue, was that of the plaintiff, Washington, as follows:

“I was * * * walking up the railroad track, when X heard a train coming. * * * X stopped off the track and stood beside the passing train. Just as the last box car was passing me, I stepped close to the train, and as X did so my foot struck against something in the street, and I fell, and my feet went under the box car, and it cut both my feet off.”

It is clear enough, we think, that if the injury to Washington happened in the way he said it did, it was the result of accident, and not of negligence on the part of the railway company; while in this .case, if the injury to Mrs. Courtney happened as she and her husband said it did, it was not the result of mere accident, but of an act of the porter, which the jury had a* right lo say was in violation of the duty he owed to Mrs. Courtney.

[4] Of the 12 assignments remaining, several are predicated on the action of the court in instructing the jury as he did, and the others on his action in refusing special charges requested by appellant. We do not agree that the court’s main charge was subject to any of the objections urged to it. On the contrary, we think the charge correctly and clearly presented to the jury all the issues made by the evidence. Nor do we agree that the special charge given at appellees’ request, with reference to their conduct after Mrs. Courtney was injured, was erroneous. “One who has suffered personal injuries through the negligence or wrongful acts of another,” said the writer of the article on “Damages” in 8 R. C. L. p. 442 —

*841 “is bound to exercise reasonable care and diligence to avoid loss, or to minimize the consequences of such injury, and be cannot recover for so much of his damage as results from his failure to do so. Thus he is bound to exercise reasonable" diligence in securing medical or surgical aid, to take all reasonable care of the injury, and to make use of reasonable means to prevent any aggravation of it, or to effect its speedy and complete cure. He is not required to take the best of care of his injuries, however, nor to employ the means best adapted to heal them. It is sufficient that he act in good faith and with due diligence, and that he exercise only ordinary care and reasonable or ordinary prudence or judgment. If he does this, it is immaterial that the means employed do not effect a cure, or that another method of treatment might have given better results.”

[5] We think the matters embraced in the special charges refused were sufficiently covered by the instructions given to the 'jury, and that, had the special charges, so far as correct, been given, they would have been a mere repetition in other words of instructions already given to the jury.

There is no error in the judgment, and it is affirmed.