(after stating the facts as above).

[1] The principal questions to be considered on this appeal are that of whether or not the ordinance, in question is entirely valid and within the. police powers of the city of Tyler to enact and enforce, and .the jurisdiction of the court to entertain this petition for injunction.. The trial court was not without jurisdiction to hear and determine whether or not an injunction should be granted so far as it was alleged in the petition that the ordinance was void and its enforcement would result in an injury to and a destruction of the applicant’s property right of doing an authorized business. City of Houston v. Richter (Tex. Civ. App.) 157 S. W. 189; Auto Transit Co. v. City of Fort Worth (Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S. W. 685. In considering the next proposition we are not concerned with the particular merits of the suspension, but only with the principles of law which are involved in a consideration of the validity of the ordinance. The effect of the ordinance in question is, in part, to authorize and direct the city manager to suspend the license of any owner or operator of any vehicle for hire in the city of Tyler when such owner or operator is guilty of drunkenness, .misconduct, or reckless violation of the traffic .ordinances. Legislation of the character embraced in the general scope of this ordinance as to the suspension or revocation of the license or permit is ordinarily sustained. upon the ground that the municipality has authority, under its general police powers, to provide all reasonable regulations that may be necessary affecting public health, public safety, or morals, and, with this object in view, to provide for the revocation of the license or permit óf all persons, whose practices, character, or misconduct renders them unfit to engage or remain in the particular pursuit. It is, not a matter of doubtful, opinion that drunkenness, misconduct, or reckless violation of *874 traffic ordinances, which are matters of conduct specified in the ordinance rendering the person liable to the penalty of suspension or even revocation of his license, apply to matters of conduct which directly bear upon and affect the safety and morals of the community in the operation of vehicles on the public streets. And, referring to the city charter, there is specially conferred the authority “to license and regulate persons, corporations and associations engaged in any business,” and also “to regulate and control the use for whatever purpose of the streets and other public places.” Under these provisions it is evident that full power is lodged in the municipality to enact ordinances regulating both “persons” engaged in the “business” of running vehicles, including automobiles, for hire, and the use of the streets by such persons, in the interest of the safety and morals of the citizens of the community. An ordinance was so enacted by the city commission, the legislative body of the city, providing for a license fee which was imposed on the privilege of exercising the vocation or business of operating a vehicle, including an automobile, for hire. The effect of such ordinance, and it is so determined, is to levy the license fee as a means of controlling or limiting the exercise of the particular vocation or business, or, in other words, as a police regulation.

[2] Therefore the appellee’s license issued to him on the payment of the required sum of money was in the nature of a special privilege required as a condition precedent to the right to carry on his business, and was not either a contract or a vested right to do the business. 17 R. G. L. p. 476, § 5. The privilege, then, was taken by the appellee subject to any existing law or proper regulations thereafter enacted. It is conceded that the power to grant a license to exercise a particular vocation implies and includes the authority to suspend or revoke it. The instant ordinance, attacked in this appeal, was exacted by the city commission in the exercise of the authority to suspend or revoke licenses granted. The ordinance is specially attacked, it seems only so far as it empowers the city manager to suspend, in the first instance, the license for the causes stated. The city commission has not delegated to the city manager any legislative powers. The action of the city manager in passing on the suspension is not even judicial in character. Spurgeon v. Rhodes, 167 Ind. 1, 78 N. E. 228; Meffert v. State Board of Medical Registration, 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 811, affirmed 195 U. S. 625; State Board of Health v. Roy, 22, R. I. 538, 48 Atl. 802. The duties imposed upon the city manager are mere executive and ministerial acts to be performed in the execution of tile ordinance.' The city manager is required and authorized merely to act uniformly on a given state of facts, in/a prescribed manner, in obedience to the ordinance, without dependence on the exercise of judgment as to the propriety of doing so. The charter grants the city manager the authority and power to do and perform the following:

“(a) To see that the laws and ordinances are enforced. # * # * * * * *

“(g) To perform such other duties as may be prescribed by this charter or be required of him by ordinances or resolution of the commission.”

And the charter does not provide that only the city commission, as a body, shall do the acts the city manager is authorized to do in the ordinance in question. It is true that the ordinance authorizes the city manager to suspend the license whenever the specified state of facts or any one of them happens, and without a trial. The ordinance, though, is not for such reason invalid, for the ordinance intends the suspension of the license, not as a punishment or because the causes named constitute a public offense, but as a means of protection to the citizens of the community. Such causes named, as drunkenness, misconduct, and reckless violation of traffic rules, affect the qualification of the operator of the vehicle or the automobile. The acts of drunkenness or misconduct may be while operating the vehicle or an automobile, or may occur when not operating it; yet his qualifications as to whether or not he is a proper person to continue operating a vehicle or automobile are involved. The question is simply one of- the right of the public safety or morals. The licensee has no contract, but only a privilege so subject to proper conduct in the pursuit of the business. If the city manager should suspend a license without doing so in the particular manner provided in the ordinance, or under circumstances as would indicate improper motive, or erroneous information as to happening of the given fact,' ample remedy is afforded to redress the wrong, for the ordinance expressly provides for an early trial before the city commissioners sitting as a board for the purpose.

[3] The fact that the ordinance does not define “misconduct” is only a minor detail that could not be held to vitiate the whole ordinance. “Misconduct” fixes at least a practicable standard of unfitness, without danger of undue harshness. The word is sufficiently broad to cover the charge or complaint against the appellee which the city manager acted upon in this case. In a given case, though, it may be that the clear evidence may make the act charged not “misconduct” as the word would commonly be defined.

It is concluded that the petition does not authorize the granting of a temporary in *875 junction, and the judgment is reversed, and judgment is here rendered denying the applicant a temporary injunction. Appellee will pay costs of appeal.