(after stating the facts as above). An error relied on by the appellant is that the citation was void because it was directed “To the Sheriff or Any Constable of Harrison and Tarrant County.” The whole of the citation being read together, it is plainly disclosed that it is intended for the sheriff or any constable “of Tarrant County” to summon, as the writ commands, the “Southern Trading Company of Texas, a corporation domiciled in Fort Worth, Tar-rant county, Tex., having G. E. White as its president,” and for the sheriff or any constable “of Harrison county” to summon “William Jones, who resides in Harrison county Tex.” It is not reasonable to draw any other inference from the process. And therefore the direction of the statute is substantially complied with in the citation in this case. The statute requires that “one citation shall issue to each of such counties,” where there are several defendants residing in different counties, and the “citation shall be directed to the sheriff or any constable of the county where the defendant is alleged to reside or be.” Articles 1851 and 1852, Revised Civil Statutes. But the direction need not, in order to be held valid, be literally exact, for th'e statute does not provide the precise form nor make void a citation in the form as used in this case. It is a sufficient compliance with the statute if, as here, the citation commands the sheriff or constable of the county where the defendant is to summon him to appear and answer the suit.

There was no error on the part of the court in modifying the judgment originally entered, so far as to deny any recovery to William Jones on his cross-complaint against the Southern Trading Company. During the term of court all the proceedings thereof are, as usually termed, “in the breast of the court,” ¿nd under its control and liable to be altered or amended, when proper to do so, even without notice to the parties. As determined by the court, there was lack of sufficiency of service of eitation upon the appellant in the cross-complaint of William Jones, and this fact fully justified the court in altering the original judgment as done. The cross-complaint filed raised entirely new questions from the original suit, and was in the nature, of a distinct and independent action ag'ainst the appellant, wherein service of citation was necessary to give jurisdiction to the court to hear and determine it. The effect of the court’s action was to direct a severance of the cause of action set up in the cross-complaint, and it remains on the docket as a distinct suit, subject to such action, defense, and proceeding as may be proper and authorized by law. Any findings of the jury on special issues relating to the cross-complaint was, as decided by the court, void for lack of jurisdiction to determine the issues. Therefore the appellant cannot complain of the modification, because the court’s ruling relieved it of any judgment on the cross-complaint; and appellee Jones cannot complain, because service of citation was not complete on his cross-complaint, and it was within the deseretion of the court to refuse to delay the case any longer for service.

The plaintiff, M. Feldman, was entitled to a judgment against the appellant on the indorsement of the notes, even though the maker, Jones, was released because of failure of consideration. One of the liabilities assumed by the indorser of a negotiable note is that the note will be paid according to its purport, and that it is the valid instrument it purports to be. 1 Daniel on Neg. Instr. (5th Ed.) § 669a; 3 R. C. L. § 363, p. 1148.

*704 As there appears no ground to complain of the judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff against appellant, that judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.