McCombs v. Dallas County
Cases that cite this one
10 later published cases cite this decision.
- Harper v. Lindsay (District Court, S.D. Texas 1978)
- Roger Borgelt, Mark Pulliam, Jay Wiley, and the State of Texas v. Austin Firefighters Association, Iaff Local 975 City of Austin And Marc A. Ott, in His Official Capacity as the City Manager of the City of Austin (Tex. 2024)
- Vamarie, Inc. v. Ball (Tex. App. 1990)
- State Ex Rel. Creighton University v. Smith (Neb. 1984)
- Panitz v. Comptroller of the Treasury & State Treasurer (Md. 1967)
- Town of Somerset v. Dighton Water District (Mass. 1964)
- Burton v. I. C. T. Insurance Co. (Tex. App. 1957)
- Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Oil Well Drilling Co. (Tex. App. 1953)
- State Ex Rel. v. Board of County Com'rs (Okla. 1940)
- County of Dallas v. McCombs (Tex. 1940)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
This suit challenges the constitutional validity of Senate Bill No. 224, enacted at the regular session of the 46th Legislature, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 7294a. The Act purports to grant and donate to the several counties of the State (with exceptions), for *Page 977 a period of five years, beginning with the fiscal year 1940, one-half the ad valorem taxes levied and collected by the State for general revenue purposes, in the respective counties.
The suit was brought by Chas. S. McCombs and Wm. Andress, Jr., resident taxpaying citizens of Dallas County, against the County, the County Judge, County Commissioners, Auditor, Treasurer, County Clerk, and the Tax Assessor and Collector, seeking a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the Act by the defendants named. The State of Texas, through its Attorney General, was permitted to intervene, alleging substantially the same cause of action, seeking the same relief as that sought by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs and intervener contended below, and contend here, that the Act is unconstitutional and void in that, it violates the following provisions of the Constitution, to wit: Sec. 9 of Art. 8; Sec. 1 of Art. 2; Sec. 1 of Art. 3; Sec. 18 of Art. 5; Sec. 6 of Art. 8, and Sec. 35 of Art. 3, Vernon's Ann.St.
These questions will be discussed in the order named. But, before beginning the discussion, wish to commend counsel for the parties, as well as amici curiae, for their able and comprehensive briefs and arguments, without which, our labors would have been much more arduous and difficult.
(1) Does the Act violate Sec. 9 of Art. 8 of the Constitution, in that, it diverts one-half the general revenue fund of the State, from the purposes for which the same was created, and bestows same upon counties, to be expended by, or under the direction of the commissioners' courts of the respective counties, for the various purposes named?
Section 9 of Art. 8 of the Constitution limits the amount that may be raised by taxation for general state purposes; also limits the amount that may be raised by the counties for general and specific purposes. The pertinent portion of the section reads: "The State tax on property, exclusive of the tax necessary to pay the public debt, and of the taxes provided for the benefit of the public free schools, shall never exceed thirty-five cents on the one hundred dollars valuation; and no county, city or town shall levy more than twenty-five cents for city or county purposes * * *".
Section 3 of the Act under consideration authorizes the commissioners' courts of the respective counties to expend the state funds granted, in the following language: "The taxes donated and granted by this Act and collected in each respective county shall be used by the County Commissioners' Court of said county for any purpose permitted by and not inconsistent with the Constitution of Texas, including the following purposes: (a) lowering the ad valorem tax rate for county purposes; (b) constructing flood control works and improvements in said county; (c) for improvements to prevent soil erosion and for soil conservation purposes; (d) for irrigation and drainage projects; (e) reforestation and road building; (f) conservation and utilization of water; (g) for projects sponsored by a county in cooperation with the Federal Works Progress Administration or its successors; (h) for the purchase of rights-of-way for public roads; (i) for general relief and charitable purposes; (j) for paying the interest and sinking fund on any outstanding bonded indebtedness of the county; (k) for assisting in the development of navigation; (1) and for any other purpose or purposes not specifically prohibited by the Constitution."
While it is true, no express prohibition can be found in the Constitution against the diversion of the state funds in question, and its expenditure for the purposes named, yet we think the conclusion inescapable that such is impliedly prohibited. If not impliedly prohibited, why should separate funds have been created by the Constitution, and limitations prescribed on the rates of taxation in support of each? It is said in 12 C.J. 699, Sec. 41, that: "It is not always necessary, in order to render a statute invalid, that it should contravene some express provision of the Constitution; if the act is inhibited by the general scope and purpose of the instrument, it is as much invalid as though prohibited by the express letter of some of its provisions. Therefore the implied power and restraints to be found in a constitution are a very important part of it."
The case of Carroll v. Williams,
It will be observed that the same constitutional provision, Sec. 9, Art. 8, authorizing and limiting the levy of not exceeding thirty-five cents on the one hundred dollars valuation for general state purposes, also authorizes and limits the amount of taxes that may be raised for different county purposes. As stated in 11 Tex.Jur. p. 610, Sec. 78: "The immediate purpose of the provision is to limit the amount of taxes that may be raised for these several purposes, respectively; but it is also designed to inhibit excessive expenditures for any such purpose, and to require that any and all moneys raised by taxation for any purpose shall be applied to that particular purpose and to no other." The grant of money to the counties not being authorized by any special provision of the Constitution, for reasons just stated, we think the Act is unconstitutional.
(2) Appellants' second, third and fourth grounds of attack on the Act are that, it violates Sec. 1, Art. 2, Sec. 1, Art. 3, and Sec. 18, Art. 5, of the Constitution, in that, it confers upon the commissioners' courts of the several counties legislative power, and vests in said courts jurisdiction over matters other than county business.
Section 1, Art. 2 of the Constitution, distributes the powers of government, and Sec. 1 of Art. 3 vests in the Legislature the legislative power of the State.
Although by specific terms the Act grants to the counties for five years, one-half the state's general revenue collected for various state purposes, yet it is devoid of any regulatory or administrative provision in regard to the ways and means of accomplishing the purposes for which the money is appropriated; thus, in effect, confers upon each commissioners' court, carte blanche, legislative authority to adopt its own ways and means of furthering and consummating the various enterprises and purposes named in the Act; and the ways and means adopted by the several commissioners' courts may, and doubtless would be as variant as the counties involved are numerous. Aside from the granting provision (Sec. 1) and the designated purposes for which the money may be expended (Sec. 3), the Act is a mere skeleton and incomplete.
The rule is announced in 11 Am.Jur. 924, Sec. 215, that: "One of the most important tests as to whether particular laws amount to an invalid delegation of legislative power is found in the completeness of the statute as it appears when it leaves the hands of the legislature. The generally recognized principle is that a law must be so complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government that nothing is left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature. The rights, duties, privileges, or obligations granted or imposed must be definitely fixed or determined, or the rules by which they are to be fixed and determined must be clearly and definitely established, when the act is passed by the legislature and *Page 979 approved by the governor. The law must be perfect, final, and decisive in all of its parts, and the discretion which is given must relate only to execution."
The case of Peabody v. Russel,
Whether or not an act contains a delegation of legislative power, must be tested by its own terms. In the following cases, the question was considered and discussed: Green v. City of Amarillo, Tex. Civ. App.
The Constitution, Sec. 18, Art. 5, provides that: "* * * The county commissioners so chosen, with the county judge, as presiding officer, shall compose the County Commissioners Court, which shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State, or as may be hereafter prescribed".
In the early case of Sun Vapor Electric Light Co. v. Keenan,
So, we conclude that the Act confers upon the commissioners' courts of the several counties, legislative authority with reference to the accomplishment of the various purposes for which the money was appropriated, also confers upon said courts jurisdiction over matters, other than strictly county business, and for these reasons, we hold the Act unconstitutional and void.
(3) Appellants also contend that, in attempting to draw money from the State Treasury, without a specific appropriation and for a longer term than two years, the Act violates Sec. 6 of Art. 8 of the Constitution.
Section 1 of the Act, among other things, provides that, "The taxes hereby donated and granted shall be levied and assessed and collected as now provided by law, except that the Assessor and Collector of Taxes in each respective county shall forward his reports to the Comptroller of Public Accounts as provided by law and shall pay over to the Treasurer of the county *Page 980 one-half (1/2) of all moneys collected by him at the end of each month and during the period covered by this donation, except such amounts as are allowed by law for assessing and collecting the same, and shall forward a duplicate copy of the receipt given him by the County Treasurer for said money to the Comptroller."
We do not think that the attempted arrest of the money and its diversion from the State Treasury to those of the counties, as provided in the Act, can be given the effect of changing the nature of the fund, or of exempting the Act from the provisions of Sec. 6 of Art. 8 of the Constitution. As heretofore shown, one-half the State ad valorem taxes, levied and collected for general purposes, is appropriated to the counties for a period of five years, to be expended, by or under the direction of the respective commissioners' courts, for any purpose, state or county, not inconsistent with, or expressly prohibited by the Constitution. But the Act fails to specify any particular purpose or purposes for which the money must be spent, leaving the selection of the subjects and the amount to be allotted to each, to the uncontrolled discretion of the respective commissioners' courts. And furthermore, the amounts appropriated, necessarily, are indefinite, and incapable of being rendered certain, in that, the rate of taxation (an essential element in determining the amount of tax money to be collected) has not yet been ascertained and fixed, under rules prescribed by Arts. 7041-7044, for either of the five years involved.
The term "specific appropriation" used in this connection has been construed by the courts of this and other states. One of the latest cases is that of National Biscuit Co. v. State,
The Florida Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Bonsteel v. Allen,
It is contended, however, that our Supreme Court, in several instances, has held that similar appropriations by the Legislature were not controlled by the provision of the Constitution under consideration; notably, in the case of Aransas Pass v. Keeling,
As the Act under consideration cannot, in our opinion, be justified under either Sec. 8 of Art. 11 as a sea wall appropriation, or under Sec. 51 of Art. 3, as a public calamity appropriation, or under any other special provision of the Constitution, it follows, necessarily, that it is controlled and limited by the provisions of Sec. 6 of Art. 8; and, as the appropriation is not specific, and made for a longer term than two years, we think the Act must be condemned as unconstitutional and void.
(4) Appellants also contend that the Act violates Sec. 35 of Art. 3 of the Constitution, in that, it contains more than one subject. We do not regard the reported cases on the subject of any particular value as authorities, except as general principles and guiding rules are announced. The fundamental reason for such a provision, as stated in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.) p. 170, arose from: "The practice of bringing together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature and having no necessary connection, with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all, and thus secure the passage of several measures, no one of which could succeed upon its own merits, was one both corruptive of the legislator and dangerous to the State." And in R.C.L vol. 25, pp. 843, 844, sec. 90, it is said that: "The word `subject' is used to indicate the chief thing to which legislation relates, * * *. The `subject' of an act is the matter or thing forming the groundwork of the act, which may include many parts or things, so long as they are all germane to it and are such that if traced back they will lead the mind to the subject as the generic head."
The different purposes for which the tax money appropriated to the counties may be spent, named or comprehended within the general terms of Sec. 3 of the Act, are numerous and variant, each, in our opinion, being a separate legislative subject, within the meaning of the Constitution. An act that simply appropriates money, without stating the purpose for which the appropriation was made, in our opinion would be incomplete, and an ineffectual piece of legislation. The purpose, the enterprise to be furthered or accomplished, constitutes and is the real subject of legislation; the amount of money allocated being simply an incident. The Act, in our opinion, contains as many separate and distinct legislative subjects, as the purposes are numerous for which the Legislature authorized the expenditure of the money.
Appellees insist, however, and argue (see their brief, p. 156) that the subject of the Act is, the "remission" of taxes and that, the purposes for which the money may be expended are not properly a part of the subject matter of the Act. The fault with this contention is that, the Act does not pretend to remit taxes; nor, in fact, could taxes be remitted under its terms, but rather, would be collected, and after being collected, diverted from the State Treasury and paid into the Treasuries of the respective counties. Remission is forgiveness, pardon; refraining from exacting, or enforcing, as the remission of a penalty. The provisions of the Act for-bid the idea that its subject matter is the remission of taxes. The Act purports, and is, an attempt to appropriate moneys belonging to the general fund of the State, to the respective counties, to be expended for named and unnamed purposes; each, in our opinion, constitutes a separate legislative subject, hence it follows that, in our opinion, the Act offends Sec. 35 of Art. 3 of the Constitution, and for that reason also, is void.
The burden of appellees' contention is that, Senate Bill 224 does not offend the Constitution in either respect as contended by appellants. In preceding pages, we have discussed these questions and reached conclusions contrary to the contention of appellees. They also contend that, the purposes named and unnamed in the Act, for which the Legislature granted money to the counties, are governmental in nature, and affected with a public interest, therefore, the Legislature was well within its constitutional authority in enacting the same. We think it may be conceded that, in a general sense, the purposes for which the Act grants money to the counties, mentioned in Sec. 3, are governmental in nature, and affected with a public interest, as contended; but, even so, that fact would not justify the Legislature in disregarding constitutional rules of legislative procedure and implied prohibitions against its authority to act in the manner attempted. The objections urged to the Act are not leveled, so much at the want of power in the Legislature to authorize the expenditure of public moneys for governmental *Page 983 purposes, as at its disregard of the prescribed course or mode of legislative procedure, and the violation of restrictions against accomplishing the purposes indicated by the means adopted.
We have reached the conclusion that the Act offends the Constitution in the several respects heretofore mentioned. In view of the disposition made of the case, we do not deem it necessary to discuss or decide either of the other questions presented. It follows therefore, that, in our opinion, the Act is void, and it is so declared. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and judgment is here rendered for appellants, perpetually enjoining appellees from acting under, or attempting to enforce the Act in question.
As the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the case, and an application for writ of error may be promptly presented, appellees' motion to certify questions of law involved in this case is overruled.
Reversed and rendered.
We have heretofore filed our conclusions of law (the opinion) on all material questions of law brought up for review, but did not file conclusions of fact, and must decline to do so, for the reason that, in our opinion, this is not a fact but altogether a law case.
In Hurt v. Cooper, Tex. Civ. App.
In 6 R.C.L. sec. 112, pp. 112, 113, the same doctrine is announced, in the following language: "Judicial Determination of Facts. — The constitutionality of a law is not to be determined on a question of fact to be ascertained by the court. If under any possible state of facts an act would be constitutional, the courts are bound to presume that such facts exist; and therefore the courts will not make a separate investigation of the facts, or attempt to decide whether the legislature has reached a correct conclusion with respect to them. Accordingly the validity of an enactment cannot be made to depend on the facts found on the trial of the first case involving the validity of such statute. If the rule were otherwise, the trial of the main issue would necessarily be delayed until the preliminary fact on which the validity of the contested legislative act depended should be first tried and determined on testimony; and, since this testimony might be different in different cases, there would be involved an absurdity of declaring the law constitutional one day and unconstitutional the next. * *" We therefore deny the request of appellees for additional conclusions.
As stated in our original opinion, we think that, in a general sense, the purposes for which the Act under consideration grants money to the counties (mentioned in Sec. 3) are governmental in nature and affected with a public interest. We are also of opinion that, the Legislature is not forbidden to use counties as agencies for the discharge of state obligations, provided, of course, the legislation otherwise is free from constitutional objections. For these reasons, we did not deem it necessary to comment upon the numerous authorities cited by appellees in support of these propositions.
However, a few cases cited by appellees, not heretofore commented upon, doubtless are sufficiently in point to warrant comment and differentiation. The acts of the Legislature involved in Bexar County v. Linden,
After due consideration, we overrule appellees' motion for rehearing. *Page 1118
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.