Horton v. Dental Capital Leasing Corp.
Cases that cite this one
12 later published cases cite this decision.
- Excel Auto & Truck Leasing, L.L.P. v. Alief Independent School District (Tex. App. 2007)
- Excel Auto and Truck Leasing, L.L.P. v. Alief Independent School District (Tex. App. 2007)
- 4M Linen & Uniform Supply Co., Inc. v. WP Ballard & Co. (Tex. App. 1990)
- Franklin National Bank v. Boser (Tex. App. 1998)
- Superior Packing, Inc. v. Worldwide Leasing & Financing, Inc. (Tex. App. 1994)
- King Consultants, Inc. D/B/A Quicksilver Construction, and Frontier Insurance Company of New York v. Bee Equipment Sales, Inc. (Tex. App. 2003)
- First State Bank of Miami v. FATHHEREE (Tex. App. 1993)
- Pierson v. GFH Financial Services Corp. (Tex. App. 1992)
- Robert J. Pierson v. GFH Financial Services Corporation & Drew Darby (Tex. App. 1992)
- Bilmar Drilling, Inc. v. Ifg Leasing Co., Bilmar Drilling, Inc. v. Ifg Leasing Company (5th Cir. 1986)
- In re Oerke (United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas 1986)
- Hughes v. Houston Northwest Medical Center, Inc. (Tex. App. 1984)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Dr. J. Dean Horton appeals from a judgment awarding Dental Capital Leasing Corporation $31,668.64 as damages for breach of an equipment rental contract. The parties entered into an agreement whereby Dental Leasing would supply Dr. Horton with certain equipment for use in his practice. Dr. Horton was to make six payments of $52.50 and 78 payments of $790.36. In August 1979, Dr. Horton stopped making payments. Dental Leasing brought suit for the unpaid installments. Dr. Horton counter-claimed, alleging fraud in the inducement, deceptive trade practices, and that the agreement was a security transaction rather than a lease agreement. The jury returned a verdict favorable to Dental Leasing and judgment was entered on the verdict. Dr. Horton assigns error because the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s failure to find that Dental Leasing was a secured party, and that such fact was conclusively established; because no issue on money damages was submitted to the jury; and because he was denied the right to open and close argument.
Evidence is not required to support the jury’s failure to find an affirmative fact, and since Dr. Horton had the burden of proof on his claim that the lease was in reality a security agreement, he can successfully complain on that basis only if that fact was established conclusively, or the jury’s failure to so find is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Traylor v. Goulding, 497 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. 1973); Visage v. Marshall, 632 S.W.2d
The point that an issue on damages was necessary is not well taken. The damages would be uncertain only if the agreement constituted a security agreement and evidence of the value of the equipment at the time of default became relevant. Since the jury failed to find the instrument to be a security agreement, the damages were the amount of unpaid lease rentals, and their amounts were undisputed. An issue on an undisputed fact need not be submitted to the jury. Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1971); Wingfield v. Bryant, 614 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Civ.App.— Austin 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Dr. Horton contends he should have been given the right to open and close argument. In order for a defendant to have the right to open and close, he must have the burden of proof on the whole case under the pleadings or have the burden of proof on all issues submitted. Walker v. Money, 132 Tex. 132, 120 S.W.2d 428 (1938); Cano v. Macarena, 606 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1980, writ dism’d); Community Public Service Co. v. Andrews, 590 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Meece v. Wade, 512 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding Walker v. Money, supra, applicable to Rule 269(a)); Tex.R.Civ.P. 269(a). Dental Leasing, as plaintiff, had the burden of proof on the issue of attorney’s fees. Since Dr. Horton did not have the burden on all issues, the trial court properly denied his request to open and close argument.
Additionally, there has been no showing that the denial of the right to open and close was calculated to and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment, as is required to constitute the denial a reversible error. Francis v. Stanley, 574 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1978, no writ); Seureau v. Mudd, 515 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Western Fire
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Concurring Opinion
concurring.
I agree that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed. Horton’s claim that he showed conclusively that the lease constituted a security interest lacks merit. Because the lease provided that he could become the owner of equipment for additional non-nominal consideration, the détermination of whether the lease was intended for security was a fact question. Federal Sign and Signal Corp. v. Berry, 601 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1980, no writ); Tackett v. Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co., 579 S.W.2d 545 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Davis Brothers v. Misco Leasing, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 908 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1974, no writ); Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 1.201(37) (1968). The jury’s failure to find the fact that the lease was intended for security makes discussion of whether the option price is nominal unnecessary.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.