PER CURIAM

A jury found appellant guilty of aggravated robbery and assessed punishment, enhanced by two previous felony convictions, at imprisonment for life. Appellant's court-appointed attorney filed a brief in which he concludes that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), by advancing two contentions which counsel says might arguably support the appeal. See also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Jackson v. State, 485 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).

A copy of counsel's brief was delivered to appellant, and appellant was advised of his right to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. Subsequently, appellant tendered a "pro se petition for post conviction writ of habeas corpus." This instrument was filed by the Clerk as a pro se brief. The points of error contained in the pro se brief are identical to the arguable points contained in counsel's brief.

Appellant's first arguable point of error is that trial counsel was ineffective. Having reviewed the record as a whole, however, we conclude that appellant has not overcome the presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Appellant's second arguable point is that the district court erred by overruling his motion to suppress the identification testimony of the two complaining witnesses. We find, however, that the testimony adduced at the suppression hearing supports the court's ruling. The points of error are overruled.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Before Justices Powers, Aboussie and Kidd

Affirmed

Filed: December 13, 1995

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