PER CURIAM

Appellants John Dumas and Sara Dumas attempt to appeal the trial court's judgments resolving their disputes against appellees JJ Builders, Inc., and James Brown. We must determine which of several orders constitutes the trial court's final judgment and whether the Dumases timely appealed that judgment.

Both appeals arise from an agreement for JJ to build a house for the Dumases. The Dumases, alleging that JJ had failed to comply with the construction plans, halted work on the house before it was finished. JJ then sued the Dumases for breach of contract. The Dumases counterclaimed, seeking damages for deceptive trade practices and attorney's fees. The Dumases also cross-claimed against Brown, the president of JJ, alleging deceptive trade practices and seeking attorney's fees.

The trial court subsequently ordered the cause to alternative dispute resolution, but excepted from the order the Dumases' claim against Brown for deceptive trade practices. The Dumases amended their cross-claim following the trial court's order to add claims against Brown for real estate fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and negligence. Both JJ and Brown amended their pleadings to allege that the Dumases' claims against them were groundless and brought in bad faith or to harass. After the arbitrator awarded JJ $14,000 and the Dumases $20,500, JJ and Brown jointly moved the trial court to render judgment on the arbitration award. In their motion, Brown asserted that the arbitrator's ruling as to JJ was dispositive of any claim the Dumases had against him. JJ and Brown prayed that the trial court deny the Dumases any recovery against Brown and deny them any recovery against JJ beyond that awarded by the arbitrator.

On December 15, 1994, the trial court signed a judgment confirming the arbitration award. The court expressly denied all relief not specifically granted. No party requested the court to reconsider or modify its order.

On February 10, 1995, the trial court signed an order severing the claims between JJ and the Dumases into a new cause, numbered 93-11375-A, and leaving the claims between the Dumases and Brown in the original cause, numbered 93-11375. On March 1, 1995, the trial court vacated the order signed February 10 and ordered that the judgment signed December 15 was the final judgment. The trial court signed a second judgment on the same day dismissing with prejudice the Dumases' claims against Brown and, again, ordering that the December 15 judgment was the final judgment.

On March 10, 1995, the Dumases filed their appeal bond in trial-court cause number 93-11375, to appeal the March 1 judgment dismissing their claims against Brown. The Clerk docketed this appeal as number 3-95-206-CV. Also on March 10, the Dumases filed a bond in trial-court cause number 93-11375-A to appeal the February 10 order severing their cause of action against JJ. The Clerk docketed this appeal as number 3-95-207-CV.

The Dumases have timely appealed only if the final judgments were those signed on February 10 and March 1. Their appeal bonds are ineffective to perfect an appeal from the judgment signed December 15, which had to be perfected by January 17. Tex. R. App. P. 41(a). In response to the Clerk's letter questioning the timeliness of their appeals, the Dumases emphasize the failure of the December 15 judgment to address all claims: they note that the arbitrator addressed only the claims between JJ and the Dumases and assert that the order confirming the arbitrator's award went no further.

To the contrary, JJ and Brown's motion to confirm the award placed all parties before the trial court and sought to have the Dumases' remaining claims against both of them dismissed with prejudice. The court recited in the December 15 judgment that both JJ and Brown were entitled to judgment confirming the arbitration award. By ordering that all relief not specifically granted was denied, the trial court manifested its intent to dispose of all parties and all claims. See Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. 1993). If this judgment erroneously granted more relief than was proper, the Dumases' remedy was to timely appeal it. Id.

We conclude that the judgment signed December 15 was the final judgment for both appeals. Because the December 15 judgment was a final judgment and because the Dumases did not file a timely motion for new trial, the trial court's plenary power expired on January 17. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(d). The orders signed after January 17 accordingly had no effect. Because the Dumases failed to timely appeal the December 15 judgment, we dismiss their appeals for want of jurisdiction. Tex. R. App. P. 60(a)(2); Davies v. Massey, 561 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Tex. 1978). In light of this disposition, we dismiss the Dumases' motions to extend the time to file a brief in each appeal.

Before Chief Justice Carroll, Justices Aboussie and Jones

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction on Both Causes

Filed: May 31, 1995

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