Robert Earl Clark v. State
Robert Earl Clark v. State
Opinion
Appellant and the deceased, Marcus Preston, got into an argument at a party on the night of November 6, 1995. According to appellant's testimony, Preston, whose blood alcohol level at autopsy was 0.30, threatened to kill appellant. Preston then walked to his pickup truck. Appellant, who testified that he knew Preston kept a pistol in the truck, followed. Preston got in the truck and pulled something from under the seat. Believing it was the pistol, appellant stabbed Preston once in the abdomen with his pocket knife. Appellant testified, "I wasn't trying to hurt him, I wasn't trying to kill him, I was trying to stop him from attacking me because I didn't know what he had." A witness testified that he saw appellant holding a six-inch hunting knife after the stabbing. Appellant insisted, however, that he stabbed Preston with his pocket knife. This was corroborated by the testimony of the medical examiner, who said the fatal wound appeared to have been caused by a three-inch blade. The medical examiner also testified that it was unusual for a single stab wound to the abdomen to be fatal, but that appellant's knife had severed a major artery and Preston bled to death within minutes. Neither knife nor pistol was found by the police during a subsequent search of the truck.
Appellant and Preston had come to blows during an argument one month earlier. There was testimony that appellant pulled a knife during this earlier altercation, but appellant denied it.
In his first point of error, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to sustain the finding that he intentionally or knowingly killed Preston. Sec. 19.02(b)(1). A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (West 1994). A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Sec. 6.03(b). Proof of a culpable mental state generally relies on circumstantial evidence. Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
A factual sufficiency review begins with the presumption that the evidence supporting the conviction is legally sufficient. Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992, pet. ref'd as untimely filed). When conducting a factual sufficiency review, we do not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Instead, we consider all the evidence equally, including the testimony of defense witnesses. Orona v. State, 836 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992, no pet.). We will set aside a verdict for factual insufficiency only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Stone, 823 S.W.2d at 381.
Both in his statement to the police and in his trial testimony, appellant insisted that he did not intend to kill or hurt Preston, but stabbed him only in self-defense. On the other hand, Preston's alleged weapon was not found in his truck and there was testimony that appellant threatened Preston with a knife during their previous argument. While this testimony was disputed, it was for the court, as trier of fact, to decide the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony. See Miller v. State, 909 S.W.2d 586, 593 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, no pet.). Appellant's claim that he did not intend to kill Preston was also inconsistent with his acknowledged conduct. Appellant followed Preston to his truck even though Preston had just threatened to kill him and, by his own testimony, appellant knew that Preston kept a firearm in the truck. The district court could reasonably conclude that if appellant had not intended violence, he would have chosen a different course of action. Stabbing Preston in the abdomen was an obviously dangerous act from which the court could infer the culpable intent or knowledge, even if a wound of the sort inflicted by appellant is not ordinarily fatal.
Appellate courts exercise their fact jurisdiction only to prevent a manifestly unjust result. We are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside a verdict merely because we feel that a different result is more reasonable. Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 135. The district court's determination that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused Preston's death was not manifestly wrong or unjust. Point of error one is overruled.
In his two remaining points, appellant contends the district court erroneously overruled his objections to leading and irrelevant questions. Albert Cook was a State witness who had known appellant for seventeen years and was obviously reluctant to testify. Cook testified that appellant came to his house after stabbing Preston and said he wanted to turn himself in to the police. Cook was impeached with his written statement to the police, in which he said that appellant asked Cook to take him to Austin but that Cook talked appellant into going to the police. Questioning Cook about which version of events was more likely to be accurate, the prosecutor asked, "[I]f somebody were to ask you a year from today, about your experience up here on the witness stand . . . what exactly I would have said to you or what [defense counsel] would have said to you, it would be hard a year from today to remember exactly what we said to you or what your answers had to be, wouldn't it?" Appellant objected that the prosecutor was leading the witness. The objection was overruled and Cook answered the question, "Yes."
The mode of interrogation is subject to the reasonable control of the trial court. Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 610(a). Leading questions should not be used on direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his testimony or if the witness is hostile. Rule 610(c). Appellant was not unduly prejudiced by virtue of the prosecutor's question and we are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion by overruling the objection. See Newsome v. State, 829 S.W.2d 260, 270 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, no pet.). Point of error two is overruled.
Cook was also questioned about a scabbard that was identified as belonging to appellant and introduced in evidence. Using a three-inch pocket knife for demonstrative purposes and over appellant's objection that the question was irrelevant, the prosecutor asked Cook if he would carry such a knife in that scabbard. Cook said he would not, that the scabbard was too big.
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 401. Whether appellant used a large hunting knife or a relatively small pocket knife was a disputed fact that was of consequence to the determination whether appellant intentionally or knowingly killed Preston. While the medical examiner may have provided the most authoritative evidence in the record with respect to the size of the fatal weapon, the State was not foreclosed from questioning other witnesses about the matter. No error is presented. Point of error three is overruled.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
J. Woodfin Jones, Justice
Before Chief Justice Carroll, Justices Jones and Kidd
Affirmed
Filed: October 9, 1997
Do Not Publish
appellant knew that Preston kept a firearm in the truck. The district court could reasonably conclude that if appellant had not intended violence, he would have chosen a different course of action. Stabbing Preston in the abdomen was an obviously dangerous act from which the court could infer the culpable intent or knowledge, even if a wound of the sort inflicted by appellant is not ordinarily fatal.
Appellate courts exercise their fact jurisdiction only to prevent a manifestly unjust result. We are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside a verdict merely because we feel that a different result is more reasonable. Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 135. The district court's determination that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused Preston's death was not manifestly wrong or unjust. Point of error one is overruled.
In his two remaining points, appellant contends the district court erroneously overruled his objections to leading and irrelevant questions. Albert Cook was a State witness who had known appellant for seventeen years and was obviously reluctant to testify. Cook testified that appellant came to his house after stabbing Preston and said he wanted to turn himself in to the police. Cook was impeached with his written statement to the police, in which he said that appellant asked Cook to take him to Austin but that Cook talked appellant into going to the police. Questioning Cook about which version of events was more likely to be accurate, the prosecutor asked, "[I]f somebody were to ask you a year from today, about your experience up here on the witness stand . . . what exactly I would have said to you or what [defense counsel] would have said to you, it would be hard a year from today to remember exactly what we said to you or what your answers had to be, wouldn't it?" Appellant objected that the prosecutor was leading the witness. The objection was overruled and Cook answered the question, "Yes."
The mode of interrogation is subject to the reasonable control of the trial court. Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 610(a). Leading questions should not be used on direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his testimony or if the witness is hostile. Rule 610(c). Appellant was not unduly prejudiced by virtue of the prosecutor's question and we are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion by overruling the objection. See Newsome v. State, 829 S.W.2d 260, 270 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, no pet.). Point of error two is overruled.
Cook was also questioned about a scabbard that was identified as belonging to appellant and introduced in evidence. Using a three-inch pocket knife for demonstrative purposes and over appellant's objection that the question was irrelevant, the prosecutor asked Cook if he would carry such a knife in that scabbard. Cook said he would not, that the scabbard was too big.
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 401. Whether appellant used a large hunting knife or a relatively small pocket knife was a disputed fact that was of consequence to the determination whether appellant intentionally or knowingly killed Preston. While the medical examiner may have provided the most authori
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