IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-98-353-CR

     JACK HANCE,

                                                                              Appellant

     v.

     THE STATE OF TEXAS,

                                                                              Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 2

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court # 98074 CR2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Jack Hance filed a notice of appeal on December 7, 1998, appealing an adverse decision on a pretrial motion to suppress. We notified him on December 17 that we did not believe we had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 44.3. Hance has filed a motion to dismiss his interlocutory appeal. Id. 42.

      We grant Hance's motion and dismiss his interlocutory appeal.

                                                                         PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Davis,

      Justice Cummings, and

      Justice Vance

Dismissed on appellant's motion

Opinion delivered and filed December 30, 1998

Do not publish

1 ); document.write( '
Close' ); document.write( '' ); } one particular factor, language indicating a present act, is sorely missing from the letter in this case. See General Elec. Capital Auto Financial Leasing Services, Inc. v. Stanfield, 71 S.W.3d 351, 355 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, no pet.); In re Fuentes, 960 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi, 1997, no writ); Schaeffer Homes, Inc. v. Esterak, 792 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1990, no writ). The rendition of a judgment is a present act, either by spoken word or signed memorandum, which decides the issues upon which the ruling is made. Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Tex. 1976). A judge’s intention to render judgment in the future cannot be a present rendition of judgment. Id.

      The letter the trial court sent to the parties in this case stated: “I will withdraw my ruling and the summary judgment previously signed. I will reconsider the same on February 1, 2003." (Emphasis added). It is not clear that the trial court intended a present ruling withdrawing his earlier order. This is especially true when, as here, the trial court indicated a specific date in the future when he intends to reconsider the ruling and the summary judgment. By stating he intended to “reconsider the same” in the second sentence of the letter, and having referenced only his “ruling and summary judgment previously signed” in the first sentence, the logical construction of the letter is that on February 1, 2003, he will reconsider the earlier ruling and summary judgment, in essence the judgment he signed on January 10, 2003. His use of the term “will,” not once but twice, in the letter also indicates an event to occur in the future, not a present act.

      This letter is not an order. Because the majority finds that it is, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s decision to deny the petition for writ of mandamus.

                                                                   TOM GRAY 

                                                                   Chief Justice

Dissenting opinion issued and filed December 17, 2003