Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 1998

Douglas Hegar v. Charles B. McGregor

Douglas Hegar v. Charles B. McGregor
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas · Decided March 18, 1998

Douglas Hegar v. Charles B. McGregor

Opinion

Dunbar v. State







IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS


No. 10-98-021-CV


     DOUGLAS HEGAR,

                                                                                              Appellant

     v.


     CHARLES B. MCGREGOR,

                                                                                              Appellee


From the 74th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court No. 97-426-3

                                                                                                                

MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                                                                                                


      This is an interlocutory appeal from a denial of transfer of venue. Because such interlocutory appeal is prohibited, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal and dismiss it for that reason.

      The appellee, Charles B. McGregor, brought suit against the appellant, Douglas Hegar, to collect on a note Hegar signed for the purchase of 33.26 acres of land located in Brazos

County. Hegar filed a motion to transfer venue to Brazos County, and after a hearing, the trial court denied Hegar’s motion in a written order signed December 8, 1997. On December 19, Hegar filed a pro se notice of appeal “on the basis that the [m]andatory [v]enue requirements of the State of Texas require that any lawsuit involving interest in real property has to be brought in the county where the real estate is located.” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.011 (Vernon Supp. 1998).

      McGregor has filed a motion to dismiss Hegar’s appeal, contending this court lacks jurisdiction over Hegar’s appeal because an interlocutory appeal from a trial court’s venue determination is expressly prohibited by rule and statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.064(a) (Vernon 1986); Tex. R. Civ. P. 87; Orion Enters., Inc. v. Pope, 927 S.W.2d 654, 659 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, orig. proceeding). We agree.

      Absent a statute making an interlocutory order appealable, a final judgment is necessary to our jurisdiction. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012 (Vernon 1997); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2d 677, 678-79 (Tex. 1990). Section 15.064 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code states that “[n]o interlocutory appeal shall lie from the [trial court’s venue] determination.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.064(a). An interlocutory venue determination is not appealable until it is made final by merger into the final judgment. Orion Enters., 927 S.W.2d at 659. Therefore, we grant McGregor’s motion and dismiss Hegar’s appeal for want of jurisdiction.

      McGregor also “suggests” that this court award damages against Hegar for filing a frivolous appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 45. We decline to do so.

      The appeal is dismissed.

                                                                               PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Davis,

      Justice Cummings, and

      Justice Vance

Appeal dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed March 18, 1998

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