Luis Noguez v. State
Luis Noguez v. State
Opinion
BACKGROUND
Diana Coronado was found stabbed to death in her apartment on December 18, 1997. Prior to her death, she was involved in a tumultuous relationship with the appellant Luis Noguez. Noguez and Coronado lived together for approximately five months until November 1997. After their breakup, Coronado found a new roommate Wyndi Moreland and began dating Ian Aguirre. Moreland, Aguirre, Coronado's mother, and a co-worker of Coronado's all testified that Noguez and Coronado often argued during their relationship.
Noguez's boss testified that when Coronado and Noguez ended their relationship, Noguez stopped working regularly and became unreliable. On the day of the murder, Noguez left his job in the afternoon and bought a new set of clothes to go to a Christmas party; however, he never arrived at the party. Noguez admits that on that night he had sexual relations with Coronado, after which they argued over $500 he claimed she owed him.
At 10:45 that night, Aguirre went to Coronado's apartment to meet her, but Coronado did not answer the door. Aguirre tried calling her from a nearby gas station, but she did not answer the phone. Concerned, Aguirre called the police. When the police suggested calling Coronado's roommate, Aguirre returned to the apartment and found the door unlocked. He discovered Coronado on her bed under a sheet with blood on her chest.
Officer Ernest Pedraza investigated the crime scene and found that nothing was stolen or ransacked. He concluded Coronado knew her killer. Officer Pedraza investigated Aguirre and eliminated him as a suspect. Noguez admits he was furious with Coronado, but he claims he was only at her apartment from approximately 6:00 to 7:30 p.m. However, Aguirre testified that he was on the phone with Coronado at 7:30 that evening.
The day after the murder, Doctor Robert Bayardo performed an autopsy of Coronado and estimated the time of death at 9:30 p.m. December 18. Dr. Bayardo testified that four stab wounds to the chest caused her death. He also found several wounds on Coronado's hands and forearms and bruises on her head and legs which he described as defensive wounds. He did not find any injuries indicating sexual assault; however, Dr. Bayardo testified that this type of examination does not necessarily reveal such injuries.
Two days after the murder, police found Noguez's car. Noguez had always taken meticulous care of his car and rarely lent it to others. The car was abandoned and appeared to have been recently cleaned. Noguez's friend Frank Tubb testified that Noguez told him that he got drunk, crashed his car, and abandoned it after seeing Coronado for the last time. Officer Pena found a small blood smear on Noguez's steering wheel. Jody Williams of the Department of Public Safety analyzed the blood smear and concluded that Coronado could not be excluded from consideration as the person whose DNA was found in that smear. Williams was able to exclude both Aguirre and Noguez as sources of the blood.
Noguez never returned to work, never picked up his last paycheck, and went on a month-long drinking binge. He turned himself in to the police on January 22, 1998. The jury found Noguez guilty of murder with a deadly weapon, and the trial court assessed a life sentence in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Corrections. Noguez filed a notice of appeal complaining of legal and factual insufficiency in issues one and two and the trial court's failure to consider the full range of punishment for the offense in issue three.
The issues Noguez identified on appeal do not match the arguments he actually makes. Noguez's first issue states that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict that he intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Coronado. Instead, the argument he advances actually disputes the sufficiency of the evidence relating to the killer's identity, not the killer's mental state. Noguez's second issue claims the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to show he used a deadly weapon. However, he concedes that his only complaint regards the sufficiency of the evidence identifying the killer. The first and second issues thus collapse into one complaint that identity was not sufficiently proven because the State used circumstantial evidence.
Since the substance of these first two issues is the same, we will address them together using the established and distinct standards for legal and factual sufficiency. We will then consider the claim that the trial court failed to consider the full range of punishment when sentencing Noguez.
Legal and Factual Sufficiency
In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and decide if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The standard of review is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence. See Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 158-162. Therefore, Noguez's claim that the evidence is circumstantial does not affect our analysis.
First, we address whether there is legally sufficient evidence to support two findings: (1) that Noguez was the person who killed Coronado; and (2) that he did so with a deadly weapon.
The jury was presented with sufficient evidence that Noguez was the killer. Four witnesses testified that Noguez and Coronado argued often during their romance. The relationship had ended recently and abruptly. Noguez's boss Mason testified that Noguez became increasingly unreliable in November and seemed despondent when Mason tried to counsel him. Coronado's mother testified that Coronado told her that Noguez was following her. Noguez admitted that he was in Coronado's apartment on the night of the murder and had sex with her. He admitted that he was upset with Coronado because of some money he felt she owed him. Noguez also admitted in a videotaped interview with Officer Pedraza that he pushed Coronado and that he was so furious that he was out of his mind.
The autopsy revealed fresh bruises and defensive wounds on Coronado's body. Noguez's car contained a smear of blood on the steering wheel that could not have been Aguirre's or Noguez's, but could have been Coronado's. Officer Pedraza testified that he believed Coronado knew her killer. From this uncontested testimony, the jury could have concluded that the blood found in Noguez's car was Coronado's. The facts show Noguez had both the opportunity and a motive to kill Coronado. His own testimony placed him at the scene within two hours of the estimated time of the killing. Based on this evidence, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Noguez killed Coronado.
Evidence also was presented from which the jury could conclude that Noguez used a deadly weapon in committing the murder. Noguez admits that the evidence establishes that whoever killed Coronado did so with a deadly weapon. Officer Pena testified that Coronado's ripped shirt and bra indicate that both were torn at the same time by a sharp instrument. Noguez had access to knives and other sharp instruments at work. Having found that Noguez was the murderer, the jury could reasonably infer that Noguez killed Coronado with a deadly weapon.
When reviewing for factual sufficiency, we do not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Instead, we consider all of the evidence equally, including the testimony of defense witnesses and the existence of alternative hypotheses. See Orona v. State, 836 S.W.2d 319, 321 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992, no writ). We will set aside a verdict for factual insufficiency only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992, writ ref'd as untimely filed). The standard of review is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence. See Geesa, 820 S.W.2d 154, 158-162.
Considering all of the evidence, testimony, and hypotheses equally, Noguez's conviction is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be wrong and unjust. A rational jury could have doubted Noguez's testimony at trial because that testimony and his earlier videotaped version of the events are often contradictory. Noguez testified that he was at Coronado's apartment on the night of the murder between 6:00 to 7:30 p.m. and that he left after arguing with her about a loan. However, Aguirre testified that he talked with Coronado on the phone at 7:30 p.m. and she failed to mention Noguez, suggesting that Noguez's visit came later. Noguez first admitted he tore Coronado's bra and shirt, but later changed his testimony, claiming that he meant only that he unhooked her bra. Noguez testified that he abandoned his car because he decided to drink heavily, yet he told his friend Tubb that he abandoned his car after an argument with Coronado. Noguez testified that he learned Coronado was dead when he tried to retrieve his car a month later, but in his earlier videotaped conversation with Officer Pedraza, he had asked if Coronado was dead. We find the evidence to be factually sufficient and overrule the points raised in issues one and two.
Sentencing
Noguez asserts in his third issue that the trial judge erred in failing to consider the full range of punishment at the sentencing phase. The sentencing-hearing record reflects that Noguez did not say anything after being sentenced. His failure to object at the hearing waives his right to appellate review of the sentencing. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Since Noguez did not preserve his right to review, we need only note that the punishment of life is within the appropriate range for the offense of murder. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 19.02, 12.32 (West 1994). We overrule the complaint raised in the third issue.
We conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction of murder with a deadly weapon and that he waived the right to complain about his sentence of imprisonment for life. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Bea Ann Smith, Justice
Before Chief Justice Aboussie, Justices B. A. Smith and Yeakel
Affirmed
Filed: October 14, 1999
Do Not Publish
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Noguez killed Coronado.
Evidence also wa
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.