Appellant Marion Bach appeals from a decree terminating the parent-child relationship between appellant and her three children and appointing appellee Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services permanent managing conservator. We will affirm the decree of termination.

A court may terminate a parent-child relationship if it finds that: (1) the parent has engaged in any of the specific conduct enumerated in the Family Code as grounds for termination; and (2) termination is in the child's best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1), (2) (West Supp. 1999); Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1976); D.O. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 352 (Tex. App.--Austin 1993, no writ). Here, the trial court found: (1) that appellant knowingly placed her children, or knowingly allowed them to remain, in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being, see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D) (West Supp. 1999); (2) that she engaged in conduct, or knowingly placed her children with persons who engaged in conduct, that endangered their physical or emotional well-being, see id. § 161.001(1)(E); and (3) that termination was in the children's best interest. See id. § 161.001(2). In three issues, appellant contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings.

BACKGROUND

Appellant married Gerrald Raymond Franklin Edwards Bach III ("Bach") in 1993. The couple had three children: A.B., born in July 1994; J.S.B., born in July 1996; and S.B., born in December 1997. Appellant testified at trial that Bach abused her repeatedly during their marriage and during her pregnancies. Between September 1996 and April 1997, Child Protective Services ("CPS") received four referrals alleging that appellant and Bach were abusing and neglecting the two children they had at that time. ⁽¹⁾

Appellant testified that in April 1997 Bach beat her severely and tried to strangle her with an appliance cord. Following the attack, appellant took A.B. and J.S.B. and moved to the Center for Battered Women (the "Shelter"). The court issued protective orders prohibiting Bach from going around appellant and their children. Although appellant requested these orders, other witnesses testified that she continued to see Bach even while she was staying at the Shelter. The Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services ("DPRS") initiated its suit to terminate appellant's and Bach's parental rights on May 7, 1997. According to a court investigator's report, the trial court granted show cause orders to the DPRS the same day. These orders stipulated that if appellant left the Shelter and returned to live with Bach, DPRS would take immediate custody of the children. On May 8, 1997, CPS workers found appellant with Bach and J.S.B. at the CPS offices. Following an interview with a CPS case manager in which appellant and Bach failed to explain this violation of the protective and show cause orders, DPRS removed the two children from the couple's custody. DPRS placed the two children in foster care on May 21, 1997. When the third child, S.B., was born to appellant in the Del Valle jail ⁽²⁾ in December 1997, DPRS amended its termination petition to include him and also removed him to foster care. On February 9, 1998, Bach filed an affidavit in which he relinquished his parental rights. Appellant waived her right to a jury trial, and termination proceedings commenced on February 17. Following two days of testimony, the trial court recessed so that CPS could investigate the possibility of placing the three children with their maternal grandparents. The proceedings resumed February 27, at which time a CPS case worker testified that the agency had found appellant's parents to be unsuitable for placement. On April 8, the trial court issued its final decree terminating the parental rights of both appellant and Bach. Following the trial court's denial of appellant's motion for a new trial, appellant appealed to this Court.

DISCUSSION

In her first issue, appellant complains that the evidence is factually insufficient to establish that she knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions that endangered their physical or emotional well-being. In her second issue, appellant raises the same challenge to the trial court's finding that she engaged in conduct, or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct, that endangered their physical or emotional well-being. We will discuss both issues together.

Standard Of Review

The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for factual sufficiency of the evidence by the same standards that would apply in reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting jury findings. See Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991). To review the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding on which the appellee had the burden of proof at trial, we must consider and weigh all the evidence and should set aside the judgment only if the evidence is so weak as to render the judgment clearly wrong and unjust. See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965); In re King's Estate, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex. 1951). "The clear and convincing standard of proof required to terminate parental rights does not alter the appropriate standard of appellate review." D.O., 851 S.W.2d at 353.

Surroundings and Conduct that Endangered the Children

The supreme court has interpreted the term "endanger" for purposes of involuntary termination proceedings. "While we agree that 'endanger' means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury." Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. This Court has held that abusive or violent conduct in a child's home can produce an environment that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of a child as contemplated by the termination statute. See D.O., 851 S.W.2d at 354-55. There is ample evidence in this record of violent conduct within the household where appellant permitted her children to live.

Appellant herself testified of the repeated abuse she suffered at the hands of her ex-husband. In addition to the strangulation incident, appellant testified that Bach beat her about the head and neck when she was pregnant and tried to dislocate her shoulder while shoving her against a wall. She testified that the children were often present when Bach assaulted her, and that A.B. tried to intervene on one occasion. There was also testimony that Bach physically abused A.B. by throwing her down on the bed "like a sack of concrete" and almost choking her with his fingers while trying to stop her crying. While there is no direct evidence that either of the two younger children were physically abused, the evidence of misconduct directed towards the mother and A.B. shows a course of conduct that has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional well-being of all the children. See Trevino v. Texas Dep't of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 893 S.W.2d 243, 247-48 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, no writ). Appellant also admitted that Bach had threatened the lives of the children and that she feared he would do them physical harm. ⁽³⁾

In addition to Bach's abuse of appellant and A.B., there is evidence that appellant allowed her children to live in physical surroundings that endangered them. Appellant testified that the family lived in one-room camping trailer measuring ten feet by twenty-four feet. The trailer leaked and had electrical problems. She said that she feared that turning on a light might electrocute A.B., the oldest child. Appellant also testified that A.B. had easy access to a propane stove, and she feared the child would turn it on. Despite these fears, appellant admitted to leaving A.B. and J.S.B. alone in the small trailer for periods of time varying from fifteen to twenty minutes while she went to make phone calls.

Arlita Allen, appellant's landlord at a trailer park on Yager Lane, also described some of the dangerous conditions to which the children were exposed. She testified that appellant and Bach rented a space located approximately forty-five feet from Yager Lane--a street heavily trafficked by large construction vehicles. Allen said that she had advised Bach to put a fence around the yard of the trailer to protect the children, but no fence was ever installed. Allen testified that the door of the trailer opened toward Yager Lane and that appellant could not see the door from one of the phones she used. Allen testified that appellant had left the children unsupervised at least three times and that on one of these occasions two-year-old A.B. drove a toy car out into Yager Lane and had to be rescued by a seven-year-old neighbor.

There is evidence that in addition to exposing the children to hazardous surroundings, appellant also engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the children's well-being. Appellant allowed her ex-husband to abuse the oldest child, A.B., as described above. Bonnie Neuendorff, an employee of Travis County Sheriff's Office Victim's Services, testified that appellant kept J.S.B. in a crib that was too small and in which she could not turn over. Neuendorff said that, as a result, the back of the child's head was "almost flat as though she had never been any place but on her back." Appellant's own testimony revealed an incident in which she tied up A.B. so that the child could not leave the trailer while appellant went to check on laundry. Finally, there was testimony from appellant and others that appellant would often leave the children unsupervised in situations which exposed them to threat of harm. Although no direct evidence indicates that S.B., only two months old at the time of trial, was ever endangered by appellant's conduct, a parent's abusive conduct directed toward one child will suffice to support termination as to other children. See Lucas v. Texas Dep't of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 949 S.W.2d 500, 503 (Tex. App.--Waco 1997, pet. denied); Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Bowling, 833 S.W.2d 730, 732-33 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, no writ).

After careful review of this record, we are persuaded that clear and convincing evidence exists that is factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that appellant: (1) knowingly placed the children, or allowed them to remain, in surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being; and (2) engaged in conduct, or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct, that endangered their physical or emotional well-being. Either of these grounds would support termination if that were found to be in the children's best interest. We overrule the first two issues.

Best Interest of the Children

In her third issue, appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding that termination of her parental rights would be in the children's best interest. The Texas Supreme Court has recognized several factors that may be considered in determining when termination is in a child's best interest:

(A) the desires of the child; (B) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (G) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (H) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (I) any excuse of the acts or omissions of the parent.

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976) (footnotes omitted). This list of relevant considerations is not exhaustive, a trial court is not required in each case to consider all of these factors, and other factors may be considered when appropriate. See id.

DPRS presented evidence of only some of the Holley factors. The record contains evidence of the following factors: the physical and emotional needs of the children; appellant's parental abilities; the parenting-assistance programs available to appellant; the stability of appellant's home; the danger to the children's well-being; the acts or omissions of the parent; and any excuse for those acts or omissions.

Emotional and physical needs

The record contains evidence that appellant failed to ensure that the children's needs were being met. Neuendorff visited appellant after deputies were called to the trailer on a family violence call. Neuendorff testified that appellant told her that there was no money to provide the children with essentials such as milk and diapers. Neuendorff also testified that the children were drinking bottles of spoiled milk.

There was also evidence that the children were developmentally delayed. Allison Gouris, the children's foster mother and a special education teacher, testified that the two older children, A.B. and J.S.B., were developmentally delayed when they came to live with her. Gouris stated that A.B., who was almost three, had problems articulating clearly; had a limited vocabulary; did not have the expressive or receptive language that would be expected for a child her age; had difficulty walking; and was less coordinated than normal. Gouris also testified that the child would throw abnormally violent tantrums. Gouris stated that J.S.B., at age eleven months, exhibited a developmental delay of about six months in all areas when she came into Gouris's care. Gouris said the child was just beginning to sit up and did not yet know how to crawl, whereas a typical child would have been beginning to walk at that age.

Melanie Ross, A.B.'s teacher, is an expert in the education of developmentally delayed preschoolers. Ross testified that there are three possible causes for the language delays seen in A.B.: untreated ear infections, lack of exposure, and aphasia. ⁽⁴⁾ Ross explained "lack of exposure" as a lack of experiences on which to draw. Ross said that A.B. "had a very limited understanding of very general concepts typical for her age." Ross said such information--the names of common objects and animals and things in the environment--would normally be acquired through interaction with others and teaching by a parent. Ross testified that A.B.'s language delays were probably due to lack of exposure, while her articulation difficulties were probably due to a hearing defect that resulted from an untreated ear infection. Ross also testified that at the beginning of the school year, A.B. would act out in class and had an abnormal reaction to discipline.

Appellant's parental abilities

The record contains evidence regarding appellant's psychological profile and parental abilities. Diana Verdin, a psychological associate at DayGlo, ⁽⁵⁾ testified as an expert that appellant had been diagnosed with borderline personality and dependent personality disorders. Verdin explained that persons with borderline personality disorder show a pattern of instability and have difficulty with problem solving. Verdin testified that persons with dependent personality disorder seek to connect with someone who will make their decisions for them and take responsibility for their daily activities. Verdin stated that personality disorders are formed from a young age and are extremely difficult to alter with therapy. Verdin also testified that Dr. Sandy Andrews, the psychologist who had conducted the evaluation of appellant, expressed concerns that appellant had underlying general hostility that might be directed towards the children.

Jeanne Vilim is a licensed professional counselor who conducted appellant's Protective Parenting Phase 2 class and therapy. Vilim testified as an expert that appellant did not appear to understand how to care for her children in a protective manner. Vilim expressed concern that appellant was unable to recognize that it was not an option to neglect her children and that certain actions presented unacceptable risks.

Jessica Ritter was the DPRS case worker assigned to appellant in June 1997. She testified that appellant had expressed to her that it was not inappropriate for A.B. to be in the bed with her and her ex-husband while they were having sex. ⁽⁶⁾ Ritter also testified that in her opinion appellant had made no progress in addressing the issues that resulted in the children being removed.

Parenting-assistance programs available to appellant

The record contains evidence that although various assistance services were available to appellant, she failed to take full advantage of the services. Several witnesses testified that appellant seemed to make real efforts only when she was about to go to court.

Margaret Bassett was the counselor at the Shelter with whom appellant was required to meet. Bassett described appellant as not being fully "engaged" in the therapy and said appellant seemed to be participating only because it was required and not out of a genuine desire to improve her situation.

Jessica Ritter testified that appellant did not enter one-on-one counseling regarding her battered woman issues as mandated by the DPRS service plan. Ritter also testified that Dr. Andrews did not expect appellant to make any progress in the Protective Parenting Program unless she began counseling for battered women. Maryann Fisher, another CPS caseworker, testified that appellant had made no apparent progress in working her service plan.

Stability of appellant's home

Appellant and others testified regarding appellant's lack of a stable housing situation. CPS had been unable to investigate two referrals in September 1996 and another in January 1997 because the family moved repeatedly. Three days after the removal of the children, appellant moved back into the trailer on Yager Lane with Bach. The next month, appellant moved into an apartment with Bach--a violation of both the lease and the protective orders. While appellant was in the process of being evicted in late October 1997, she was sent to jail for two months, during which time she gave birth to her third child, S.B. When appellant was released in December, she stayed at the Salvation Army, where Bach was also staying. At the February 1998 trial, appellant testified that she was living with a friend in a one-bedroom apartment that would be unsuitable for the children. At the June 1998 hearing on the motion for new trial, appellant testified that she was living in a homeless shelter.

Emotional and physical danger and appellant's inappropriate acts or omissions

Appellant's acts and omissions that endangered her children and that undermine the parent-child relationship between appellant and her children are detailed above. In addition, the record contains evidence that appellant remained connected to her abusive ex-spouse and that this connection represented a continuing danger to the children. Maryann Fisher testified that as long as appellant remained in a relationship with Bach, the children would be endangered.

Appellant's trial counsel characterized appellant's behavior as symptomatic of battered women's syndrome. Appellant was clearly a victim of an abusive husband, and the record shows that she was unwilling or unable to take the necessary steps to leave the situation. Ritter and others testified that appellant was dishonest about her continuing relationship with Bach and that appellant did not avail herself of counseling concerning the issues she faced as a battered woman.

We believe the court properly considered the emotional and physical needs of the children, the parenting ability of appellant, her ability to benefit or not to benefit from assistance with her parenting, her lack of stability in her personal life, the emotional and physical dangers confronting the children, and appellant's past omissions in not removing the children from dangerous situations. The evidence is factually sufficient on which the trial court could find from clear and convincing evidence that it was in the children's best interest to terminate appellant's parental rights. We overrule appellant's third issue.

CONCLUSION

Because there is factually sufficient evidence to support all three of the challenged findings that justify terminating appellant's parental rights under section 161.001 of the Family Code, we affirm the trial court's decree terminating appellant's parental rights.

Marilyn Aboussie, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Aboussie, Justices Kidd and Patterson

Affirmed

Filed: April 29, 1999

Do Not Publish

1. CPS was unable to conduct investigations on the first three referrals because the family moved.

2. Appellant was incarcerated for driving a vehicle for Bach and another man while the two men burglarized cars and stole property.

3. Appellant divulged Bach's threats towards the children as an explanation for why she had not left Bach.

4. Aphasia is an impairment in the ability to use words as symbols caused by a brain lesion. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 99 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1986). Ross testified that she thought aphasia was a possible cause of the child's delays because the speech and language pathologist reported that a program for children with aphasia might help the child. There was no testimony on whether any medical tests had been performed.

5. DayGlo provides children's services through the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation.

6. Appellant testified that there was only one bed in the trailer and that appellant, Bach, and A.B. slept in it together. Appellant testified that she and Bach engaged in intercourse while A.B. slept and did not discontinue the activity when the child awoke.

f being evicted in late October 1997, she was sent to jail for two months, during which time she gave birth to her third child, S.B. When appellant was released in December, she stayed at the Salvation Army, where Bach was also staying. At the February 1998 trial, appellant testified that she was living with a friend in a one-bedroom apartment that would be unsuitable for the children. At the June 1998 hearing on the motion for new trial, appellant testified that she was living in a homeless shelter.

Emotional and physical danger and appellant's inappropriate acts or omissions

Appellant's acts and omissions that endangered her children and that undermine the parent-child relationship between appellant and her children are detailed above. In addition, the record contains evidence that appellant r