Quincy Tyrone Doss v. State

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-99-00652-CR Quincy Tyrone Doss, Appellant v. State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 299TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 984826, HONORABLE JON N. WISSER, JUDGE PRESIDING

Quincy Tyrone Doss pleaded guilty to robbery and received a sentence of twelve years in prison. He asserts by a single point of error that his counsel was ineffective for not informing him that the State offered a sentence of eight years imprisonment for a plea of guilty to the greater offense of aggravated robbery.1 We will affirm the judgment and sentence.

An appellant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show (1) that his trial counsel made such serious errors that he was not functioning effectively as counsel, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so much that the appellant was deprived of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-89 (1984); see also Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The appellant must prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of evidence. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We must strongly presume that trial counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable representation. Id.

The only testimony on Doss’s asserted error claim came at the hearing on the motion for new trial (which did not include his appellate claim among its assertions of ineffective assistance). Trial counsel testified that he discussed with Doss the State’s offer of eight years for a plea to the charge of aggravated robbery; Doss testified that trial counsel did not discuss the offer of an eight- year sentence. After hearing this testimony and other evidence about trial counsel’s representation, the district court stated that he thought that trial counsel did an “outstanding job” representing Doss; the court stated he had originally believed that Doss would receive thirty to forty years in prison.

Doss has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his trial counsel was ineffective and has not overcome the strong presumption of acceptable representation. We overrule the point of error and affirm the judgment.

David Puryear, Justice Before Justices Kidd, B. A. Smith and Puryear Affirmed Filed: May 31, 2001 Do Not Publish