$14,700.00 v. State
$14,700.00 v. State
Opinion
Before BOYD, C.J, QUINN, and REAVIS, J.J.
Aaron W. Frye (Frye) appeals from a judgment forfeiting $14,700.00 to the State of Texas. Frye filed a notice of appeal on March 22, 2002. However, Frye did not pay the $125 filling fee required from appellants pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 5. Nor did he (at the time he noticed his appeal) file an affidavit pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.1 relieving him of his duty to do so. By letter from this Court dated March 27, 2002 we informed Frye that "[f]ailure to pay the filing fee may result in dismissal." Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c); See Holt v. F. F. Enterprises, 990 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1998, pet. ref'd.).
In apparent response to our March letter, the court received from Frye a document entitled "Appeallant's Request of Court to Excuse the Late Filing Of Waiver Application" and the "Application for Waiver of Court Fees and Costs" wherein he represented that he was an indigent. Yet, the application was not filed within the deadlines set by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.1(c)(1) (establishing the deadline by which one must request leave to proceed as a pauper) and 20.1(c)(3) (establishing the deadline by which one must seek leave to extend the deadline contemplated under 20.1(c)(1)). Nor was it accompanied by any motion for leave to extend either of those deadlines. Thus, we conclude that appellant's request and application is ineffective to relieve him from his obligation to pay the aforementioned filing fee.
Due to appellant's failure to pay the filing fee, we dismiss the appeal pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3 (c).
Per Curiam
Do not publish.
NO. 07-09-0281-CR
NO. 07-09-0282-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
NOVEMBER 2, 2010
______________________________
JOHN VANEXCEL,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
_____________________________
FROM THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NOS. 46,760-B, 46,761-B; HON. JOHN B. BOARD, PRESIDING
______________________________
Memorandum Opinion
______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Appellant, John Vanexcel, appeals his convictions for possession of marijuana (46,760-B) and possession with intent to deliver cocaine (46,761-B). Through five issues, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
In general, when a court overrules a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, the defendant need not object to the same evidence in order to preserve the error on appeal. Brown v. State, 183 S.W.3d 728, 741 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd) (citing Moraguez v. State, 701 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986)). However, when a defendant affirmatively states that he has "no objection" to the admission of the complained of evidence, the defendant waives any error in the admission of the evidence. Brown, 183 S.W.3d at 741; see also Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) (holding that appellant's complaint that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of illegal seizures was rendered moot when State offered complained of evidence and defense counsel affirmatively stated "no objection"). Here, the record reflects that appellant obtained an adverse ruling on his pretrial motion to suppress. However, when the State offered the offending evidence during the bench trial, appellant's trial counsel waived any error in the admission of the evidence by affirmatively stating no objection. See Brown, 183 S.W.3d at 741. Therefore, we overrule all of appellants issues as an attack on the motion to suppress ruling.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Per Curiam
Do not publish.
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