Before BOYD, C.J., and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.

Appellant Vickie Dianne Gray has appealed from a judgment adjudicating her guilt for the offense of securing execution of a document by deception after a motion by the State to revoke her probation and the resulting sentence of two years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Department of Criminal Justice. However, she has now filed a motion to dismiss that appeal, which is signed by both appellant and her attorney.

Because appellant has complied with the requirements of Rule 42.2(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure and because we have not yet delivered our opinion prior to receiving appellant's motion to dismiss, we hereby grant the motion.

Furthermore, having dismissed this appeal at appellant's request, no motion for rehearing will be entertained, and our mandate will issue forthwith.

John T. Boyd

Chief Justice

Do not publish.

lant gave a statement to Benavidez, who interpreted it into English, wrote it down, and proffered it to appellant for his signature. Appellant placed his initials next to the Miranda warnings appearing on the statement and then signed it. Darla Richardson, a notary public and dispatcher for the Tulia police department, then notarized the statement.

Appellant initially contends that he was denied due process when the State failed to disclose, prior to trial, appellant's written statement that he signed. The statement purportedly constituted Brady material requiring disclosure. We overrule the issue because the objection now made was omitted from the grounds mentioned at trial prior to admission of the document. Because it was so omitted and the trial court was denied opportunity to consider it before ruling upon the appropriateness of the document, the ground was waived. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (requiring a contemporaneous objection); Martinez v. State, 91 S.W.3d 331, 335-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that the objection must be made when the error is first perceived).

Through his second issue, appellant contends that the written statement alluded to in his first issue was actually hearsay and failed to comport with the statutory requirements conditioning the admission of oral statements. We overrule the issue.

As with his Brady claim, appellant did not mention this ground or reason purportedly justifying exclusion of the evidence when uttering his objection. Thus, that ground also was waived. As for the purported failure to comply with the prerequisites for admitting an oral statement, we note that the statement was not oral but written and signed by appellant.

In his final issue, appellant contends that his due process and equal protection rights were violated when he was not afforded the same rights given a deaf person who makes an inculpatory statement. In other words, because a deaf person is afforded greater protections than a person who simply cannot read or write English, his due process and equal protections rights allegedly were denied him. We overrule the issue.

While appellant did refer, at trial, to the protections afforded a deaf person, he did so as a way of comparison. That is, he sought to liken the situation of a deaf person to that of someone who neither reads nor writes English. But, nowhere in his argument did he say that because a deaf person received more protections than someone who could not read or write English, the latter was denied due process or equal protection. Thus, his constitutional arguments were not preserved.

Nor did appellant endeavor to provide the court with substantive analysis explaining why those who could not speak or write English should be treated akin to those who are deaf. This would be of import in any equal protection analysis since before one can claim undue discrimination, he must show himself similarly situated to those against whom he is comparing himself. Walker v. State, 222 S.W.3d 707, 710-11 (Tex. App.-Houston [14^th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd). And, this seems especially so given that an interpreter was present who could converse with appellant in Spanish and no one claimed otherwise. Simply put, more analysis was required of appellant than simply to cite various general statutes and cases and then conclude that the constitution required the two categories of people to be treated identically. Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that issues lacking substantive analysis are waived).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Brian Quinn

Chief Justice

Do not publish.