Because the instant appeal involves the application of well-settled principles of law, we deliver this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. This is an appeal from the entry of a decree of divorce. A hearing was held before the trial court without a jury. The reporter's record consists of fourteen pages including cover page, index, and certification page. A second exhibit volume contains one two-page exhibit.

Following brief testimony from both appellee [Mary] and appellant [Johnny], the trial court decreed that there was no community property acquired during the marriage and that no children were born during the marriage nor were any expected. The record indicates that the parties were married on or about June 24, 2000. Apparently at the time of the marriage, Johnny was incarcerated in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. On the day of the hearing, appellant appeared via telephone as he was apparently still incarcerated. Both parties appeared before the trial court pro se and both also appear before us in the same capacity.

In his appellate brief, Johnny presents us with six issues. They include the following:

1. Whether the trial court erred in not allowing Johnny a jury trial.

2. Whether the trial court erred by permitting Mary to sell Johnny's separate property "before first marriage."

3. Whether Tex. R. Civ. P. 245 was violated in that Johnny was not provided proper advance notice of the hearing so as to arrange for witnesses and to be able to "bring up things from prior divorce."

4. Whether the trial court erred in denying Johnny witnesses and the opportunity to "present evidence from prior divorce decree."

5. Whether a typographical error in the final decree renders said decree void.

6. Whether the trial court erred in failing to recuse herself because of possible relationship with Johnny.

The record from the hearing supports the portions of the final decree indicating the parties acquired no community property during the marriage and that there were no children of the marriage. Furthermore, the only issue Johnny was apparently interested in litigating involved a vehicle owned by him which Mary sold during the parties' prior marriage to each other. When informed by the trial court that he should confine his questioning to events or issues occurring after the parties' second marriage in June of 2000, Johnny had no questions.

When the trial court gave Johnny the chance to present his case as respondent, the following colloquy took place:

THE COURT: Anything else you need to tell me? Any witnesses on your behalf?

MR. MEYERS: Well, I didn't have a chance to file a motion to call witnesses because I got this - - I didn't have time. I got the letter saying I would be - -

THE COURT: You would be speaking of the Order Setting Hearing letter confirming this case was set for hearing, which was signed on November 2nd, 2001?

MR. MEYERS: Right. And it takes a long time to get it down here and I didn't get it till just this past - - last Friday.

THE COURT: Okay. And if there were any fact witnesses you could have tell me about any other property in your marriage, you want to go ahead and tell me who they would be and what they would tell me about?

MR. MEYERS: Well, there wouldn't be any property.

THE COURT: Okay. If you have no property, you have no debt between the two of you, you have no children, what else could be something I need to deal with? You have no retirement, you have no military benefits. Is there anything else I need to know about that would be something that would be the subject of your marriage?

MR. MEYERS: No, I guess that would be all, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else you want to tell me, sir?

MR. MEYERS: No.

It is clear from the record, as recognized by both the trial court and Johnny, that no other matters involving the marriage were before the trial court for its consideration except the issue of irreconcilable differences. Under such factual circumstances as are present in the record before us, we find no error by the trial court in any aspect complained of by Johnny, but if the trial court committed any error, it is such that would not have caused the rendition of an improper judgment nor prevented Johnny from properly presenting his case to us on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1)(2). Johnny's six appellate issues are overruled and the trial court's final decree of divorce is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on July 30, 2002

Opinion Delivered August 15, 2002

Do Not Publish

Before Walker, C.J., Burgess and Gaultney, JJ.