Norman Ray Baynes was convicted of felony theft and sentenced to ten years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. He says that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction. In evaluating the legal sufficiency of evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We consider all evidence presented at trial, although we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the jury. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Where the record supports conflicting inferences, we will presume that the trier of fact resolved such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and defer to that resolution. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S.at 326).

A witness testified that while working late at a business in New Caney he noticed a pickup circling through the business's driveway. He later saw the driver and the passenger getting back into the truck; the witness saw the handles of a lawnmower in the bed of the truck. The witness got in his own vehicle to pursue the truck. He saw the truck connected to a jet ski trailer, with jet skis on it. He tried, unsuccessfully, to block the pickup. He followed the truck until he saw a constable who then began to pursue the truck.

Lieutenant Raymond Moore testified that he was making a traffic stop when a man pulled up and reported "stolen jet skis." Moore observed a pickup truck towing jet skis driving at high speed, running other vehicles off the road. He began to pursue it. The truck fled at speeds of eighty to ninety miles per hour, but finally reached the end of a dead-end road. The driver and the passenger fled on foot, with the passenger running across a pasture. Moore unsuccessfully pursued the driver, but the passenger was caught by other officers. Moore identified Baynes as the passenger.

Detective Craig Lawson testified that on the afternoon of the offense he responded to a radio call about a chase in progress. When he reached the end of the dead-end road where the chase concluded, he saw a neighbor pointing into a pasture. Lawson and another officer then followed a driveway in that direction to a house. A man, who Lawson identified as Baynes, was underneath the house. After initially refusing orders to come out from under the house, Baynes eventually complied and was handcuffed and informed of his rights.

Byron Smith testified that he was the owner of the jet skis and had given no one consent to take them from his property. A check for $2,300.00 was entered into evidence, which Smith identified as a check he wrote for the purchase of the two jet skis and the trailer. The court's charge instructed the jury on the law of parties.

Baynes contends that:

[N]o one saw Appellant take the jet skis; and, no one saw Appellant help anyone else take the jet skis. In addition, the evidence was insufficient to prove the value of the two jet skis to be $1500 or more.

We disagree. There was sufficient evidence to convince a rational fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt that Baynes was guilty of theft, either as a principal or as a party. Jurors may use common sense and apply common knowledge when drawing inferences from the evidence. See Clark v. State, 952 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1997, no pet.). The jury heard testimony that the passenger was in the truck when the first witness initially noticed it, that the witness followed the truck directly to the location where he saw the truck, jet ski trailer, and the jet skis, that the witness chased the truck until Lieutenant Moore began to pursue it, and that Moore pursued the truck until the chase ended and the male passenger ran from the truck. The jury could therefore rationally infer that Baynes was present at the jet ski theft. While mere presence at the scene of an offense is not alone sufficient to support a conviction, it is a circumstance tending to prove guilt, which, combined with other facts, may suffice to prove participation. See generally Suarez v. State, 31 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2000, no pet.). Baynes was found hiding under a house near the location where the chase ended. Evidence of flight from the scene of a crime is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Id. In addition, when a defendant is found in possession of recently stolen property under circumstances which offer no reasonable explanation, the factfinder may draw an inference of guilt. See Hardesty v. State, 656 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). No evidence was presented of a reasonable explanation, or any explanation, for Baynes' possession of the stolen jet skis. The owner of the jet skis testified that their value was over $1,500.00, as charged in the indictment. The sole point of error is overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

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DAVID B. GAULTNEY

Justice

Submitted on April 23, 2002

Opinion Delivered May 29, 2002

Do Not Publish

Before Walker, C.J., Burgess, and Gaultney, JJ.