IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-01-421-CR

     DAVID CARTER CAMPBELL,

                                                                         Appellant

     v.

     THE STATE OF TEXAS,

                                                                         Appellee

From the 249th District Court

Johnson County, Texas

Trial Court # F34705

O P I N I O N

                                                                                                                      David Carter Campbell pleaded guilty to delivery of marijuana and the jury sentenced him to seven (7) years’ imprisonment. In his sole point of error, Campbell argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a sentence of a prior conviction during the punishment stage of trial.

      During the punishment stage of trial, Campbell objected to State’s exhibit number seven (7). The trial court admitted the exhibit over his objection. The exhibit was a packet containing the judgment, sentence, docket sheet, and probation order of Campbell’s prior conviction for possession of marijuana. Specifically, the docket sheet reflects the punishment in that prior case as “5 yrs. Probation & $500 fine.” Campbell concedes that evidence of his prior conviction is admissible because he already entered into a stipulation earlier in trial. However, citing Tamez v. State, he argues that admitting evidence of the prior punishment of “5 yrs. Probation & $500 fine” harms him. See 11 S.W.3d 198, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

      The Rules of Evidence and article 37.07 section 3(a) govern the admissibility of evidence during the punishment stage of trial. See Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07 § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002). Generally, “relevant” evidence admitted during punishment is that which is helpful to the jury in determining the appropriate sentence. See Mendiola v. State, 21 S.W.3d 282, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Rogers, 991 S.W.2d at 266. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that prior sentences are informative to the jury in tailoring the sentence to a defendant, and therefore relevant in the context of assessing punishment. See Mendiola, 21 S.W.3d at 285; Rogers, 991 S.W.2d at 266.

      In the present case, Campbell’s sentence for his prior conviction was relevant to the jury’s assessment of punishment. Id. Likewise, the probative value of Campbell’s prior sentence of “5 yrs. probation & $500 fine” was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, even if this jury used that prior sentence as a starting point for the punishment imposed here. See Rogers, 991 S.W.2d at 266 (probative value of the defendant’s three prior sentences for robbery convictions was not substantially outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice, even if the jury used the prior sentences as a starting point for assessing punishment in the instant case). The Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that the sentencing phase presents different issues than the guilt-innocence phase of trial because admissibility of a non-capital felony offense during punishment is a function of policy rather than relevancy. See Mendiola, 21 S.W.3d at 285.

      Further, because Tamez was a guilt-innocence case, we find Campbell’s argument on appeal readily distinguishable. See Tamez, 11 S.W.3d at 202-03 (harmful evidence of prior convictions was admitted during guilt-innocence stage of trial despite defendant’s stipulation to the same offenses).

      Accordingly, Campbell’s sole point of error is overruled.

      The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                         REX D. DAVIS

                                                                         Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Davis,

      Justice Vance, and

      Justice Gray

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed August 7, 2002

Do not publish

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