Before JOHNSON, C.J., and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.

Appellant Karen Snow timely appealed the trial court's order granting appellee David Haymes, Jr., M.D.'s motion for summary judgment and order granting the motion to dismiss of appellees Richard Rosen, M.D. and SWAT Surgical Associates. Both the clerk's record and reporter's record have been filed. On April 24, 2003, appellant filed a notice of bankruptcy requesting that the appeal be suspended pursuant to Rule 8.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Attached to the motion is a copy of the voluntary petition in bankruptcy filed by Snow on October 3, 2002. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, any further action in this appeal is automatically stayed.

Thus, for administrative purposes, this appeal is removed from the docket and abated. Any documents filed subsequent to the bankruptcy petition will remain pending until the appeal is reinstated. The appeal will be reinstated upon proper showing the stay has been lifted and a request for specific action by this Court.

Accordingly, the appeal is abated.

Per Curiam

. ." So too does he castigate this body for "ignoring" his motions to 1) recuse the judge of the county court at law from a proceeding that does not pend before him and 2) to order that same judge to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.

A court of appeals only has the jurisdiction provided to it by law. Ex parte Lewis, 663 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1983, no writ) (holding that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is established by various constitutional and statutory provisions). Pursuant to statute, the appellate courts for the Amarillo Municipal Court of record are the county courts at law in Potter and Randall Counties. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §30.00931 (Vernon Supp. 2002). No authority grants us the right to hear a direct appeal from a conviction by the Amarillo Municipal Court. Therefore, to the extent that Scheidt is attempting to appeal directly to us from that court, his appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. To the extent that Scheidt is challenging the dismissal of his appeal by the Randall County Court at Law for want of jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction of that matter.

Also pending before us are two motions of Scheidt. Through the first, he asks that we recuse the Randall County Court at Law judge, and, through the second, that we hold the same judge in contempt for purportedly violating our abatement order of September 12, 2002. Scheidt provides no legal authority to support his proposition that an appellate court may order the recusal of a county court at law judge through a proceeding other than mandamus. Nor have we found any authority that enables us to recuse a trial judge from a case that does not pend before him. Consequently, the motion to recuse is overruled.

Regarding the motion to show cause, we reviewed the record of the proceeding held by the county court at law per our abatement order. The transcript of the abatement hearing illustrates that the trial court held the hearing as directed. Nothing appears of record from which one could reasonably infer that our abatement order was violated by the county court at law. Nor does Scheidt assert (other than by a general, factually absent conclusion) what the trial court should have done but failed to do to avoid purportedly violating our abatement order. Accordingly, we deny that motion as well.

Finally, we admonish Scheidt to comply with the rules of appellate procedure in prosecuting this appeal. See Kindley v. State, 879 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. App.--Houston [14^th Dist.] 1994, no pet.) (holding that individuals acting pro se on appeal must comply with the applicable rules of appellate procedure). Furthermore, we recognize that advocates of a position must advocate their position zealously. Yet, briefs, motions, or other documents tendered to this court which contain slanderous, deceitful, disrespectful, factually baseless, or uncivil comments or accusations or which are of such tone will be struck and returned. And, the continuation of such conduct will result in the implementation of other appropriate sanctions, including the dismissal of the appeal.

Per Curiam

Do not publish.

1. John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2002).