James Ray Barrow v. State
Opinion
Before QUINN and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION (1)
Appellant James Ray Barrow appeals the revocation of his community supervision. We affirm the revocation.
On his plea of guilty, appellant was convicted on May 23, 2000, of the offense of delivery of cocaine. In accordance with his plea agreement, he was sentenced by the trial court to 10 years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a $1,000 fine, the trial court suspending the period of confinement and placing appellant on community supervision for ten years.
The State filed a motion to revoke appellant's community supervision on November 3, 2001, alleging violation of six of its conditions. The violations alleged included failing to report, failing to maintain employment, failing to pay required fees and costs, failing to perform community service, failing to submit to drug and alcohol testing, and failing to pay a "Crime Stoppers" fee. At a January 9, 2002, hearing on the motion, appellant pled true to each of the six violations. On being questioned by the trial court, appellant stated that he understood the potential consequences of his plea and that he had not been promised anything in exchange for his plea. A written stipulation of evidence signed and sworn to by appellant, stating that he had committed each of the violations alleged by the State, was admitted in evidence. The appellant also took the stand and testified at the hearing. He asked the court to continue his community supervision, adding participation in a restitution center as a condition of it.
The State presented the testimony of appellant's community supervision officer. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found each of the State's allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and sentenced him to 10 years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.
Appellant's counsel has filed a brief stating that he has carefully examined the record and researched the law, and is unable to find a meritorious error to argue to this Court. The brief thoroughly discusses the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to revoke. Counsel concludes that there is no reversible error in this case, and that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S.Ct.1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Nevertheless, citing Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974), counsel presents a single point presenting the question whether the evidence before the trial court was legally and factually sufficient to permit the court to find that appellant violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision. Counsel also has filed a motion to withdraw and by letter informed appellant of his rights to review the trial record and to file a pro se brief. See Johnson v. State, 885 S.W.2d 641 (Tex.App.--Waco 1994, pet. ref'd). By letter dated July 9, 2002, this Court also notified appellant of his opportunity to submit a response to the Anders brief and motion to withdraw filed by his counsel, granting him until August 12, 2002, to do so. This court's letter also reminded appellant to contact his counsel if he needed to review any part of the appellate record to prepare a response. Appellant has not filed a brief or other response.
In conformity with the standards set out by the United States Supreme Court, we will not rule on the motion to withdraw until we have independently examined the record. Nichols v. State, 954 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1997, no pet.). If this court determines the appeal has merit, we will remand it to the trial court for appointment of new counsel. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991).
Appellate review of a revocation order is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983). The trial court abuses its discretion in revoking community supervision if the State fails to meet its burden of proof. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 494.
In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant violated a condition of community supervision as alleged in the motion to revoke. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). The trial judge in such a proceeding is the sole trier of the facts. Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). A defendant's plea of true to an alleged violation, standing alone, is sufficient to support the revocation. Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979).
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a revocation, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. (2) Jones v. State, 589 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). Appellant's pleas of true to all six alleged violations of the conditions of his community supervision and the stipulation of evidence amply support the court's judgment and there is nothing in the record to suggest that appellant was incompetent or that his pleas and stipulation were not made knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently. The record contains some evidence in mitigation of some of appellant's violations, but when, as here, more than one violation is alleged, proof of any one of them is sufficient to support the revocation. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Gobell v. State, 528 S.W.2d 223 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975); McCollum v. State, 784 S.W.2d 702, 704-05 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd).
Our review convinces us that appellate counsel conducted a diligent and conscientious review of the record. We have also made an independent examination of the entire record to determine whether there are any arguable grounds which might support the appeal. (3) See Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511. We agree it presents no meritorious grounds for review. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision. We overrule the point considered by appellant's counsel, grant counsel's motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
James T. Campbell
Justice
Do not publish.
1. Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2. In his brief, appellant's counsel cites the standard set forth in Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) as the standard to be applied to a review of the factual sufficiency of the State's evidence in support of revocation. Like other courts of appeals who have considered the question, see Becker v. State, 33 S.W.3d 64 (Tex.App.--El Paso, 2000, no pet.), we have not applied Clewis to community supervision revocations. We note, though, that even under that standard, the trial court's judgment would be sustained, as it is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129.
3. Our review is limited, though, to any issues related to revocation of appellant's
community supervision. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12 23(b); see Manuel v. State, 994
S.W.2d 658, 661-62 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999).
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NO. 07-10-00508-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT
AMARILLO PANEL A APRIL
19, 2011 LESHAWN MCREYNOLDS, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE FROM THE 108TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER
COUNTY; NO. 60,114-E; HONORABLE DOUGLAS WOODBURN, JUDGE Before CAMPBELL
and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, LeShawn McReynolds,
appeals an Order of Deferred Adjudication relating to a possession of marijuana
offense. Under the Order, appellant was
placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of ten years
and was assessed a $1,500 fine. However,
due to appellant
s nonfeasance in prosecuting this appeal, we now dismiss the
appeal for want of prosecution. Appellant
s
appointed trial counsel timely filed notice of appeal on appellant
s behalf on
December 16, 2010. On January 19, 2011,
this Court received a request from the trial court clerk for extension of time
to file the clerk
s record. This motion
indicated that appellant had not paid or made arrangements to pay for the
clerk
s record and that no attorney had
appeared
in the case for appeal. On that same date, this Court granted the
clerk
s request for extension, and sent separate notice to appellant regarding
his failure to pay for or make arrangements to pay for the clerk
s record. Further, this Court notified appellant that,
if this Court did not receive the clerk=s record or a certification from the clerk or appellant that
the record had been paid for or that satisfactory arrangements had been made
for the preparation of the record by February 21, 2011, this Court may dismiss
the appeal for want of prosecution. See
Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(b). When the Court did not receive the clerk
s
record by this deadline and, in fact, received another request for extension of
time to file the clerk
s record, again indicating that appellant had not paid
or made arrangements to pay for the clerk
s record, we abated and remanded the
case to the trial court on March 9, 2011.
Our Order of Abatement and Remand
clarified that appointed trial counsel remained responsible for ensuring that
appellant
s appeal was diligently pursued, and directed the trial court to hold
a hearing to determine: (1) whether appellant desires to prosecute this appeal;
(2) if appellant desires to prosecute this appeal, whether appellant is
indigent; (3) if appellant is indigent and desires to prosecute the appeal,
whether he is entitled to have the appellate record furnished without charge;
(4) whether present counsel for appellant has abandoned the appeal; (5) if
appellant desires to prosecute this appeal and is indigent, whether appellant=s present counsel should be replaced;
and (6) what orders, if any, should be entered to assure the filing of
appropriate notices and documentation to dismiss appellant=s appeal if appellant does not desire
to prosecute this appeal or, if appellant desires to prosecute this appeal, to
assure that the appeal will be diligently pursued. As directed, the trial court held this hearing
on March 24, 2011. Appointed trial counsel for appellant
and counsel for the State appeared at this hearing and announced ready. However, appellant did not appear. Following this hearing, the trial court
entered findings of facts and conclusions of law that include the following
findings: Since Appellant
s release from custody[,] he
has failed to have any contact with his counsel. Since Appellant
s release from custody[,] he
has failed to have any contact with his community supervision officer[,] and has
failed to comply with any terms and conditions of his community supervision. All attempts to locate Appellant by both counsel and community
supervision have been fruitless. Appellant
s conduct demonstrates a willful and intentional failure to
comply with the requirements of pursuing an appeal. Appellant has wholly failed to establish any indicia of a desire to
pursue his appeal or cooperate with the judicial process. In addition, the trial court made the
following conclusion of law:
Appellant
s willful and intentional failure to
comply with the requirements of the judicial process[,]
and his failure to communicate with counsel constitutes [a] clear desire not to
prosecute this appeal.
Under
these circumstances, we conclude that this appeal was not taken with the
intention of pursuing it to completion, but instead was taken for other
purposes unrelated to the disposition of the case. Meyer v. State, 310
S.W.3d 24, 26 (Tex.App.Texarkana 2010, no pet.). As such, we conclude that appellant
has
engaged in dilatory and bad faith abuse of the judicial process.
Id.; see also
Brager v. State, No. 0365-03, 2004 Tex.Crim.App. LEXIS 2203, at *6-*7
(Tex.Crim.App. Oct. 13, 2004) (not designated
for publication). Consequently, we now
invoke Rule 2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure as well as our inherent
authority to control disposition of causes on our docket, and dismiss this
appeal for appellant
s want of prosecution.
See Tex. R. App. P. 2, 42.3(b); Brager, 2004 Tex.Crim.App.
LEXIS 2203, at *10; Meyer, 310 S.W.3d at 26-27; Rodriguez
v. State, 970 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Tex.App.Amarillo
1998, pet. ref
d). Mackey
K. Hancock Justice Do
not publish.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.