IN RE: CLINTON ELBERT TUBBS,

RELATOR

Relator filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from an order holding him in contempt for nonpayment of temporary spousal maintenance and committing him to the Van Zandt County jail for 130 days. We deny Relator's petition.

In his second issue, Relator contends that the trial court erred, if holding the Relator in civil contempt, because the judgment does not provide a method for Relator to purge himself of the contempt and thereby obtain his release from jail.

Contempt may be either civil or criminal. See Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex. 1976). The purpose of civil contempt is remedial and coercive in nature. Id. A judgment of civil contempt exerts the judicial authority of the court to persuade the contemnor to obey some order of the court where such obedience will benefit an opposing litigant. Id. It is civil contempt when one "may procure his release by compliance with the provisions of the order of the court." Id. (citation omitted). If an enforcement order imposes incarceration for civil contempt, the order must state the specific conditions on which the contemnor may be released from confinement. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.116(c) (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 2003).

Criminal contempt on the other hand is punitive in nature. Werblud, 536 S.W.2d at 545. The sentence is not conditioned upon some promise of future performance because the contemnor is being punished for some completed act which affronted the dignity and authority of the court. Id. If an enforcement order imposes incarceration or a fine for criminal contempt, the order must include the findings specified in section 157.166(b) of the Texas Family Code. However, no means of purging the contempt must be included. Cf. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.116(b) and Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.116(c) (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 2003).

In the case at hand, the punishment is for completed acts of contempt and contained the findings required by section 157.116(b). Furthermore, the punishment is not made conditional upon future compliance by Relator. Therefore, the contempt is criminal in nature. Relator's second issue is overruled.

In his first, third, and fourth issues, Relator contends that at the contempt hearing (1) he conclusively proved that he was unable to pay his temporary spousal maintenance arrearages, (2) the trial court erred in failing to properly admonish Relator of his rights and in denying Relator's right to a jury trial without obtaining a waiver of that right, and (3) the trial court made comments at the hearing that denied Relator the right to earn good time. However, Relator failed to furnish a record of the contempt proceeding as required by Rule 52.7(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Consequently, we are unable to address the merits of Relator's first, third, and fourth issues.

For the reasons set forth above, Relator's petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

JAMES T. WORTHEN

Chief Justice

Opinion delivered October 3, 2003.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J. and DeVasto, J.