WAYNE HANDY,

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

Wayne Handy was found guilty by a jury of possession of cocaine. The trial court assessed punishment at two years of confinement in a state jail facility. In one issue, Appellant asserts his waiver of counsel was not made knowingly and intelligently. We affirm.

Waiver of Counsel

In his sole issue, Appellant concedes he was admonished as to the dangers of self-representation but argues that he was not adequately apprised in a way he could understand. He states that he "was completely clueless about what he had done when he waived his constitutional right to counsel." Describing his trial as a "zoo," "debacle," and "suicidal bloodbath," he bases his argument on portions of the record that show he was confused and ineffective as counsel for himself. It follows, he argues, that his waiver of counsel and decision to proceed pro se were not made knowingly and intelligently.

Shortly after his arrest, Appellant filed a pauper's oath requesting the court to appoint an attorney to defend him. The trial court appointed Gene Caldwell to represent Appellant. Almost five months later the court granted Mr. Caldwell's request to withdraw. Three months later, Appellant filed a second pauper's oath again requesting appointed counsel. Two weeks before trial, the trial court appointed Stephen L. Hubbard to represent Appellant.

On the day the case was set for trial, the trial court stated that, as a result of Appellant's request to represent himself, she had appointed Mr. Hubbard as standby counsel. The trial court admonished Appellant as to the punishment range for the offense and he said he understood. He stated that he was twenty-six years old and has a GED. The trial court explained that she needed to admonish Appellant regarding the disadvantages of self-representation. She pointed out that the prosecutor is highly skilled and Appellant said he was aware of that fact. She reiterated that Mr. Hubbard was there to advise Appellant if necessary but he was not going to speak on Appellant's behalf. Appellant again said he understood. She emphasized that Appellant must assume the responsibility to represent himself voluntarily and must understand the "downside" of self-representation. She explained that he would be responsible for complying with the rules of evidence and procedure and proper courtroom demeanor as any attorney would be. Appellant again said he understood. The trial judge further explained that the same would be true if he were convicted and appealed his case. Also, she explained that if he represents himself, he does so for all purposes before the jury. He stated that he was fully aware of that point. Finally, the trial court explained that "voir dire, opening statement, examination of witnesses and cross-examination of witnesses, preparation of the charge, closing argument, all of those matters will be handled just as an attorney would do." Appellant said he understood.

Any defendant may dispense with counsel and represent himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2534, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). To be constitutionally effective, that decision must be made competently, knowingly and intelligently, and voluntarily. Id., 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541. The decision to waive counsel and proceed pro se is made knowingly and intelligently if it is made with a full understanding of the right to counsel, which is being abandoned, as well as the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Id. The decision is made voluntarily if it is uncoerced. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n.12, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2687 n.12, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993). The record must contain proper admonishments concerning pro se representation and any necessary inquiries of the defendant so that the trial court may make an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S. Ct. at 2541. The record must show that the defendant was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Goffney v. State, 843 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

Before allowing Appellant to proceed pro se, the trial court learned that Appellant was twenty-six years old and had obtained the equivalent of a high school diploma. The court told Appellant the punishment range for the offense. The court explained to Appellant that, if he represented himself, he would have to abide by all of the rules attorneys must abide by. She explained that appointed counsel would only aid him as standby counsel, not speak for him. She told Appellant that the prosecutor is highly skilled and emphasized that Appellant must understand the "downside" of self-representation. Appellant told the trial court that he understood all that she explained to him. Based on the record before us, we conclude that Appellant's decision to proceed pro se was knowing and intelligent. See Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We find nothing in the record to indicate that his decision was not voluntary. There is no requirement that a defendant have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order to competently and intelligently choose to represent himself. Scarbrough v. State, 777 S.W.2d 83, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). While the choice must be knowingly and intelligently made, it need not be wise. Id. We overrule Appellant's sole issue.

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

JAMES T. WORTHEN

Chief Justice

Opinion delivered March 12, 2003.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J. and Griffith, J.