Before JOHNSON, C.J., and QUINN and CAMPBELL, JJ.

Appellant Catherine Mendoza Menzinni filed a pro se notice of appeal with this court on December 7, 2003, appealing a judgment terminating her parental rights. In her notice of appeal, she indicates that she is indigent. Because Ms. Menzinni may be entitled to representation by counsel in her appeal, we abate the appeal and remand the cause.

If an indigent parent requests appointment of an attorney in order to appeal a suit terminating the parent's parental rights, the trial court must determine the issue of indigency. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.405(e). If the court finds the person to be indigent, the court must appoint counsel to represent the person on appeal. Section 263.405(e); In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).

Consequently, we abate the appeal and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. Upon remand, the trial court is directed to determine if Ms. Menzinni is indigent and whether an attorney should be appointed to represent her on appeal. If the trial court determines that she is indigent and entitled to an attorney, the trial court is directed to appoint such for Ms. Menzinni and provide the attorney's name, address, telephone number, and state bar number in the order. The clerk's record and a reporter's record of the termination proceedings shall be filed with this court on or before March 12, 2004. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(a); Tex. R. App. Proc. 26.1(b), 35.1(b).

The trial court is directed to hold any hearings it considers necessary to comply with this order. If the trial court determines that Ms. Menzinni is not indigent or is not entitled to an appointed attorney, then such determination shall be made only following an evidentiary hearing. If held, a supplemental clerk's record and a supplemental reporter's record of the hearing on the matter of indigency are to be filed with this court on or before April 9, 2004.

Per Curiam

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2001). Furthermore, finding that any one ground warranting revocation existed, the trial court was entitled to revoke appellant's community supervision. Moore v. State, 605 S.W. 2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). Here, appellant pled true to all but two grounds contained in the motion to revoke. Standing alone, a plea of true is sufficient to support the trial court's order of revocation. Hatten v. State, 71 S.W.3d 332, 335 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Thus, the appellate record contained evidence supporting the decision to revoke probation. Furthermore, the punishment levied was within the range provided by statute.

However, we note that the judgment revoking appellant's probation included an allegation mentioned in the motion to revoke that was not supported by the record. The ground in question is that involving appellant's purported violation of the condition pertaining to the commission of a new offense. Appellant plead not true to it. Moreover, no evidence appears of record illustrating that it was violated. Simply put, appellant invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when she was asked about the allegation and opted not to discuss it. Nor did the State present evidence on the matter through other sources once appellant invoked her silence. Thus, the trial court erred in holding that she "ha[d] committed an offense against the law of this State." Nevertheless, the error is harmless given that she pled true to other grounds, and only one was needed to revoke probation.

Accordingly, we modify the judgment revoking probation by deleting from it the finding that appellant

has committed an offense against the law of this state; to wit: On or about the 11^th day of July, 2002, in the County of Hale, State of Texas, . . . Michelle Gonzalez . . . did then and there without effective consent of Stacy Griego, the owner thereof, intentionally or knowingly, break into or enter a vehicle, or part thereof, with intent to commit, and did commit theft . . . .

and affirm it as modified. See Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding that we have the authority to modify an incorrect judgment when the record permits us to do so); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd) (holding the same). Furthermore, we grant counsel's motion to withdraw.

Brian Quinn

Justice

Do not publish.