"font-family: 'CG Times', serif">      Appellant contends he was harmed by defense counsel's absence during the State's examination of Officer Baker and Mr. Rust because he was denied the opportunity to object and seek exclusion of allegedly inadmissible portions of their testimony from the court's consideration in determining guilt and assessing punishment. In support of his contention, Appellant cites Rust's testimony that Appellant was a "compulsive liar" and Baker's testimony that based on his investigation (1) he formed the opinion Appellant forged Rust's name on the certification of title in an effort to hide assets from his lienholders; (2) that he received calls from persons who indicated they had been harmed by Appellant's unethical and fraudulent business dealings; and (3) that John Hoelscher sent him documentation regarding a civil suit against Appellant.

      In essence Appellant complains that defense counsel's absence deprived him of his constitutional right of confrontation. Appellant, however, had knowingly and voluntarily, in open court, waived "the appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses." Appellant had stipulated that on November 17, 1995, he did unlawfully and without authority sign the name of Stephen A. Rust to an application for certificate of title."

      Baker testified that he investigated this case; that Appellant furnished him information as to why he transferred the vehicle to Rust without Rust's knowledge or permission; that Appellant stated the vehicle was a gift to Rust, but the title application on which Appellant signed Rust's name stated that $500 was paid for the vehicle. Baker testified it was his opinion that Appellant was trying to hide assets from creditors by the transaction; and that no one spoke highly of Appellant except his girlfriend.

      Rust testified he worked as office manager for Appellant for three months; that he did not know of a car being given to him by Appellant; that when he found that the car had been transferred to him, he went to the police; that he did not sign the application for transfer; that he did not pay Appellant $500; that while working for Appellant he learned Appellant was being sued by Hoelscher; that he came to know Appellant's reputation in community; that Appellant had a bad reputation and was a compulsive liar; and that he left Appellant's employment because he found out Appellant had forged his name to the title transfer.

      Baker's and Rust's evidence was admissible and authorized by article 37.07, § 3(a), of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

      The only harm Appellant contends was caused by defense counsel's absence was the deprivation of confrontation of the witnesses, a right which Appellant waived on October 4, 1996.

      We hold that the circumstances in this case did not rise to the level of deprivation of the right to counsel. Moreover, we determine beyond a reasonable doubt, that the circumstances, if constituting error, did not contribute to the conviction or punishment of Appellant. Tex. R. Crim. Proc. 44.2(a).

      Appellant's point is overruled. The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                               FRANK G. McDONALD

                                                                               Chief Justice (Retired)

Before Justice Cummings,

      Justice Vance and

      Chief Justice McDonald (Retired)

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed February 4, 1998

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