In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-05-00070-CR

______________________________

HUBERT LEON JEFFERSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 276th Judicial District Court

Camp County, Texas

Trial Court No. CF-05-050

Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            Hubert Leon Jefferson appeals his conviction for delivery of cocaine in an amount greater than four grams but less than 200 grams. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(d) (Vernon 2003). The issue Jefferson raises in this appeal is identical to that he presents in Jefferson v. State, Cause No. 06-05-00046-CR. Since the arguments presented are identical in each appeal, for the reasons stated in Jefferson v. State, Cause No. 06-05-00046-CR, we affirm the trial court's judgment in this case.

                                                                                    Josh R. Morriss, III

                                                                                    Chief Justice

Date Submitted:          October 21, 2005

Date Decided:             October 24, 2005

Do Not Publish

p>

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Thash Orlando Thomas has appealed from his conviction on his plea of no contest without a plea agreement to the offense of intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to a child. He entered the plea after a trial for capital murder in which the jury failed to reach a verdict and the court declared a mistrial. The State reduced the charge to injury to a child causing serious bodily injury, and Thomas entered his plea to that charge. The court sentenced Thomas to life imprisonment.

          Counsel has filed a brief in which he concludes there are no arguable grounds of error that would support reversal in this case, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In his brief, counsel reviews the course of the trial, mistrial, and the plea proceedings and sentencing in some detail, and after so doing, states that he has found no grounds in the record that would support a reversal of the conviction or sentence.

          Thomas has filed a response pro se, in which he argues that his plea provides insufficient evidence to support his conviction. The State is required to introduce evidence showing the defendant's guilt. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (Vernon 2005). Evidence is sufficient under Article 1.15 if it embraces every essential element of the offense charged and establishes the defendant's guilt. See Stone v. State, 919 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). A judicial confession alone is usually sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 1.15, but a judicial confession that omits an element of the offense is insufficient to support a guilty plea.

          A judicial confession was admitted into evidence. It is signed by Thomas, and in that confession he stipulated that, as set out by the allegations against him, witnesses would testify that Thomas intentionally and knowingly caused the death of Jalen Ardoin, an individual under six years of age, by striking him on the abdomen and chest with a deadly weapon, and that the allegations and the witnesses' testimony would be true. This is sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

          Thomas also suggests that the confession is insufficient because it was not sworn and made in open court. However, the document states that it was sworn and subscribed to by the defendant, and it was presented and discussed in open court. Thomas further suggests that, because the confession did not set out in detail each element of the offense and specify that he admitted committing each element, it is insufficient. That is incorrect. Thomas' confession states that the allegations against him were true. Standing alone, that is sufficient to support the guilty plea. Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979).

          Thomas also argues that the use of the term "charging instrument" rather than indictment or information is too vague to satisfy the requirements of Article 1.15. He has provided us with no authority to support that position, and we are aware of none. Further, the terms are typically used interchangeably, and we see no error in such use.

          We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel's brief, and agree that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. Further, we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal.

          We affirm the judgment.

                                                                           Donald R. Ross

                                                                           Justice

Date Submitted:      September 22, 2005

Date Decided:         October 7, 2005

Do Not Publish