In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-05-00080-CR

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SCOTTIE DEAN LAMBERT, Appellant

 

V.

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                                              

On Appeal from the 277th Judicial District Court

Williamson County, Texas

Trial Court No. 00-752-K277

                                                 

Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            Appellant, Scottie Dean Lambert, has filed a motion seeking to dismiss his appeal. Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 42.2, his motion is granted.

            We dismiss the appeal.

 

                                                                                    Josh R. Morriss, III

                                                                                    Chief Justice

Date Submitted:          April 25, 2005

Date Decided:             April 26, 2005

Do Not Publish

hich, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). "A routine traffic stop resembles an investigative detention." State v. Cardenas, 36 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). A law enforcement officer may lawfully stop and detain a person for a traffic violation committed in the presence of the officer. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Zervos v. State, 15 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2000, pet. ref'd).

An objectively valid traffic stop is not unlawful simply because the detaining officer had some ulterior motive for making it. A "pretext stop" refers to a detention in which an individual is detained for one offense only because law enforcement officials desired to investigate that individual for a different offense--for which they did not have valid legal grounds to stop or arrest. Garcia, 827 S.W.2d at 939-40; Randle v. State, 89 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has rejected the pretext stop doctrine. See Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Garcia, 827 S.W.2d 937; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996) (question is whether officer could have made stop for reason given). Thus, the fact that Pool may have subjectively had another motive for the detention does not render the detention unreasonable. The Texas Transportation Code provides, "An operator intending to turn a vehicle right or left shall signal continuously for not less than the last 100 feet of movement of the vehicle before the turn." Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.104(b) (Vernon 1999). Pool testified he personally observed Walker fail to signal a turn entirely and fail to signal 100 feet or more before another turn. The trial court had discretion to believe Pool's testimony over Walker's testimony. A failure to properly signal a turn is sufficient to justify a traffic stop. See, e.g., Reha v. State, 99 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.); Krug v. State, 86 S.W.3d 764, 766 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2002, pet. ref'd). Pool had an objectively reasonable basis to detain Walker--a personally observed violation of the Texas Transportation Code--and, therefore, had reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain Walker.

Because Pool had reasonable suspicion to detain Walker for failing to signal a turn, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: July 15, 2008

Date Decided: July 16, 2008

Do Not Publish

1. Walker does not challenge the actions of Pool after the initial stop. Walker argues merely that the evidence seized during the stop was tainted by the initial stop's illegality.