eption requirement of Rule 701.  Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Roberson, 100 S.W.3d at 39.

            The record reveals that January looked at the video of the offense, still footage of the video, and blown up photos of the video, and interviewed the victim and Swinnie to support his opinion that he was convinced Swinnie was the person in the video.  Thus, his testimony satisfies the perception prong.  As to the second prong, identity was an issue in the case and January’s testimony was helpful for a determination of that issue.  Further, it clarified earlier testimony on cross examination that sometimes false confessions are made and gave an explanation as to why January was convinced Swinnie was the person in the video.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the objection.  Swinnie’s first issue is overruled.

            In his second issue, Swinnie complains that the trial court erred in refusing his request to conduct a presentence report and in refusing to order an evaluation for drug abuse rehabilitation.  Swinnie argues that pursuant to art. 42.12, section 9(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he was entitled to a drug abuse rehabilitation evaluation.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 42.12, sec. 9(h) (Vernon Supp. 2007).  Subsection (h) provides in pertinent part:  “On a determination by the judge that alcohol or drug abuse may have contributed to the commission of the offense…, the judge shall direct a supervision officer…to conduct an evaluation to determine the appropriateness of, and a course of conduct necessary for, alcohol or drug rehabilitation for a defendant and to report that evaluation to the judge.”  Id. 

            But Swinnie was not entitled to the presentence report or the evaluation.  Section 9 of article 42.12 is devoted to “Presentence Investigations.”  A trial judge must direct that a presentence report be prepared “[e]xcept as provided by Subsection (g) of this section….”  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, sec. 9(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007).  Subsection (g) provides that “[a] judge is not required to direct an officer to prepare a presentence report in a felony case under this section if:  (3) the only available punishment is imprisonment[.]”  Id. sec. 9(g).  The only punishment available to Swinnie was imprisonment.  A jury found Swinnie guilty of aggravated robbery.  See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03 (Vernon 2003).  Swinnie then elected to have the trial court determine his punishment.  The trial court could not place Swinnie on community supervision.  See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, sec. 3g(a)(f) (Vernon Supp. 2007).  Therefore, the only punishment available to Swinnie was imprisonment and a presentence report was not required.^[1]

            Swinnie further argues, however, that the right to the drug evaluation is not limited to probation eligible cases.  We disagree.  Subsection (h) is an additional requirement to be added to a presentence report as generally described in subsection (a).  And because in Swinnie’s case the court is not required to order a presentence report, a drug rehabilitation evaluation is also not required.  Any other reading of subsection (h) would lead to an absurd result that the legislature could not have intended.  See Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

            Because the trial court was not required to order a presentence report or drug rehabilitation evaluation, it did not err in denying Swinnie’s request for the report and evaluation.  Swinnie’s second issue is overruled.

            Having overruled each issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                        TOM GRAY

                                                                        Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

            Justice Vance, and

            Justice Reyna

            (Justice Vance concurs in the judgment)

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed February 20, 2008

Do not publish

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