Before REAVIS and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

Following open pleas of guilty, appellant Shannon Dewayne Thompson was convicted of indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault of a child. Punishment was assessed at 20 years confinement. Presenting a sole issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to accurately admonish him on probation prior to accepting his pleas. We affirm.

Appellant was convicted of offenses for which probation is not available. ⁽¹⁾ See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(1)(C) & (E) (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 2005). Pursuant to a plea of guilty, the trial court must admonish a defendant, among other things, on the range of punishment. See id. at art. 26.13(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2005). The range of punishment does not include probation. Price v. State, 866 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex.Cr.App. 1993). If, however, a court volunteers an admonishment on the availability of probation, it imposes a duty upon itself to accurately admonish the defendant. Ex Parte Williams, 704 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986). Error has been found when a trial court improperly admonishes a defendant regarding probation, and the record demonstrates the defendant was seeking probation. Harrison v. State, 688 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985).

Appellant argues the trial court erred in misstating his eligibility for probation thereby making him unaware of the consequences of his plea because he was seeking probation. The State contends, and we agree, that when taken in its entire context, the plea hearing demonstrates appellant was hoping for deferred adjudication probation, for which he was eligible.

In part, appellant was admonished as follows:

The Court: Do you understand - well, there is no recommendation in these cases, so do you understand that pursuant to your plea, I have a number of things that I could do? I could put you on probation, I could defer adjudication, I could find you guilty and sentence you up to those ranges of punishment that we talked about in this case - you understand those are kind of the ranges of the things that could happen today?

[Appellant]: Yes, sir.

Taken out of context, the court's admonishment appears to offer regular probation. However, a review of the entire plea proceeding and the record from the motion for new trial hearing demonstrate appellant testified in hope of, and defense counsel argued for, deferred adjudication probation. The offenses appellant was charged with did not preclude his eligibility for deferred adjudication community supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(a).

Prior to hearing punishment evidence, the trial court announced, "I do accept your plea[s] of guilty. I find the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt, but I will reserve my final judgment until such time as I have heard the punishment evidence . . . ." (Emphasis added). During the punishment phase, appellant testified as follows:

Q. You're here today because you want to ask the Judge to put you on deferred probation.

A. Yes.

Q. That's the plans [sic] you have in the near future should the Judge grant your desire for deferred probation?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, we've talked about the requirements that you are going to have - whether you are found guilty and then convicted . . . .

A. Yes.

Following presentation of the punishment evidence, the trial court announced it found appellant guilty in both causes and sentenced appellant to 20 years confinement.

At the hearing on the motion for new trial, defense counsel pleaded with the trial court to postpone its decision and give appellant another chance. Counsel stated, "[i]f you put him on deferred adjudication, you would still have the full range of punishment."

A review of the proceedings in the underlying causes demonstrates the trial court did not erroneously admonish appellant that he was eligible for regular probation. Also, we have found nothing in the record showing appellant misunderstood the consequences of his plea. Appellant's sole issue is overruled.

Accordingly, the trial court's judgments are affirmed.

Don H. Reavis

Justice

Do not publish.

1. The Legislature replaced the term probation with the phrase "community supervision" in 1993. See Act of May 29, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 4.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3716.

ernon 2005); Ford v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, No. 09-98-0509-CV, 1999 Tex. App. Lexis 2623 at 3-4 (Tex. App.-Beaumont April 8, 1999, pet. denied); Wheat v. Texas Dep't of Corrections, 715 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. App.-Houston [1^st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (involving the loss of a prisoner's law books, watch, and radio). Since Ford does not claim that the operation of a motor driven vehicle or motor driven equipment was instrumental in the loss of his personalty, the Texas Tort Claims Act is of no benefit to him. Wheat v. Texas Dep't of Corrections, supra. Thus, we overrule this issue too.

Lastly, we are asked to hold that the trial court erred because Ford asserted a viable cause of action for declaratory relief. We disagree and overrule the issue for the dispute does not fall within the scope of the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act. According to the latter, a person "interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract or whose rights . . . are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have determined any question . . . arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise . . . ." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §37.004(a) (Vernon 1997). Ford did not allege that his claims implicate or arise under a deed, will, written contract, statute, ordinance, or franchise. At most, they involve the application of a rule enacted by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Yet, not even that entitles him to declaratory relief. See Bohannan v. Texas Board of Criminal Justice, 942 S.W.2d 113, 117 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied) (holding that an inmate may not use the Declaratory Judgments Act to obtain a declaration regarding the validity of a rule applicable to an inmate).

Having overruled each of Ford's issues, we affirm the order of dismissal.

Brian Quinn

Chief Justice

1. Comparison of Ford's original petition with his appellate briefs illustrates that the former contains more claims than addressed in the latter. In other words, he does not contend that all of the claims raised below were improperly dismissed. Given this, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing only those claims mentioned in his appellate brief and supplement to it.

2.In his original petition, Ford alleged that he was deprived of property without due process of law. Yet, he now informs us that "[i]n the relief of appellants' [sic] Original Petition reflect [sic] that he neither [sic] claimed deprivation of property under §1983" but that "he did claim Indemnification of Property under §§104.001 [and] 104.002, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code against Defendant TDCJ." We interpret this statement as his concession that he no longer wishes to pursue the claims involving the deprivation of property without due process.