Dennis Powell v. Leon Clements, John Allen, Glenda Adams and Ernestine Julye
Dennis Powell v. Leon Clements, John Allen, Glenda Adams and Ernestine Julye
Opinion
IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-05-00418-CV
Dennis Powell,
Appellant
v.
Leon Clements, et al,
Appellees
From the 278th District Court
Walker County, Texas
Trial Court No. 23107
ORDER
Appellant indicated to the Court his desire to mediate his dispute with various officials and doctors of the U.T.M.B. correctional managed care system. By letter, the Court requested a response from Appellees, within 21 days, to Appellant’s request to mediate. More than 21 days have passed, and Appellees have not filed a response.
The Legislature has provided for the resolution of disputes through alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 154.001-154.073 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2005). The policy behind ADR is stated in the statute: “It is the policy of this state to encourage the peaceable resolution of disputes . . . and the early settlement of pending litigation through voluntary settlement procedures.” Id. § 154.002 (Vernon 2005). Mediation is a form of ADR. Mediation is a mandatory but non-binding settlement conference, conducted with the assistance of a mediator. Mediation is private, confidential, and privileged.
We find that this matter is appropriate for mediation. See id. § 154.021(a) (Vernon 2005); 10th Tex. App. (Waco) Loc. R. 9.
The parties are ordered to confer and attempt to agree upon a mediator. Within fourteen days after the date of this Order, Appellant is ordered to file a notice with the Clerk of this Court which either identifies the agreed-upon mediator or states that the parties are unable to agree upon a mediator. If the notice states that the parties are unable to agree upon a mediator, this Court will assign a mediator.
Mediation must occur within thirty days after the date the above-referenced notice agreeing to a mediator is filed or, if no mediator is agreed upon, within thirty days after the date of the order assigning a mediator.
Before the first scheduled mediation session, each party must provide the mediator and all other parties with an information sheet setting forth the party’s positions about the issues that need to be resolved. At or before the first session, all parties must produce all information necessary for the mediator to understand the issues presented. The mediator may require any party to supplement the information required by this Order.
Named parties must be present during the entire mediation process, and each corporate party must be represented by a corporate employee, officer, or agent with authority to bind the corporate party to settlement.
Immediately after mediation, the mediator must advise this Court, in writing, only that the case did or did not settle and the amount of the mediator’s fee. The mediator’s fees will be taxed as costs. Unless the mediator agrees to mediate without fee, the mediator must negotiate a reasonable fee with Appellees, and Appellees must pay the agreed-upon fee directly to the mediator.
Failure or refusal to attend the mediation as scheduled may result in the imposition of sanctions, as permitted by law.
Any objection to this Order must be filed with this Court and served upon all parties within ten days of the date of this Order, or it is waived.
We abate this cause for mediation.
PER CURIAM
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna
(Justice Vance declined participation in deciding this Order)
Appeal Abated
Order issued and filed July 19, 2006
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te milk shake.
Based on the information received from the dispatcher, Waits continued to detain Rogers until his supervisor, Sergeant Mattix, arrived a few minutes later. Mattix sent Officer Baker to the Sonic to bring Graywolf and Elliot to the scene of the stop. While he waited for Graywolf and Elliot to arrive, Mattix spoke with Rogers, who admitted he had exposed himself.
At approximately 8:40 p.m., only fifteen minutes after the original dispatch and only nine minutes after the investigative stop, Baker returned to the scene of the stop with Graywolf and Elliot. The women positively identified Rogers as the man who had exposed himself. Rogers was then taken into custody for indecent exposure.
In his first point Rogers contends that the court erred in failing to quash the information as fatally defective. Rogers filed a motion to quash the original information, which was later amended. He never filed a motion to quash the amended information.
Rogers waived any complaint about the form or substance of the amended information on which he was tried and convicted by not attacking it in the trial court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.14(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993). We overrule point one.
In his third point, Rogers argues that the court abused its discretion by failing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest. The test to determine probable cause to arrest is whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the facts and circumstances known by the officer, or of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, were sufficient to warrant a prudent man to believe that the suspect had committed, or was committing, an offense. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). At the moment of the arrest, Officer Waits either knew, or had reasonably trustworthy information, that: (1) a crime had been committed at the Sonic Drive-in minutes earlier; (2) the victim and a witness had immediately called the police; (3) the suspect was a white male wearing a white t-shirt and driving a gold Pontiac Grand Am; (4) the license plate on the vehicle included the numbers "33" in sequence; (5) the vehicle was seen leaving the rear of the Sonic behind the bank; (6) Waits was less than a half mile from the Sonic when he saw a gold Grand Am with "33" in sequence on the license plate; (7) Waits confirmed the description with the dispatcher; (8) Waits stopped the car six minutes after the initial dispatch; (9) Waits observed a cup with the Sonic logo in the front of the vehicle; (10) Rogers had been to the Sonic; (11) Rogers had ordered only a chocolate milk shake at Sonic; (12) Rogers and his car fit the description given by Graywolf and Elliot; (13) Rogers told Sergeant Mattix that he had exposed himself; and (14) Graywolf and Elliot positively identified Rogers as the man who had exposed himself at the Sonic.
These factors, viewed in the light of Waits' training and experience, were sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence to believe Rogers had committed an offense that was either a breach of the peace or a felony. See id.; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.03 (Vernon 1977). Thus, we find that the officers properly arrested Rogers upon probable cause to believe he had committed a crime. Because the evidence was seized as incident to a legal arrest, we overrule point three.
Rogers' second point, that the court abused its discretion by not suppressing the evidence obtained as a result of an illegal stop, is not reached because we have already determined that the evidence was properly seized in connection with his legal arrest.
We affirm the judgment.
BOB L. THOMAS
Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Thomas,
Justice Cummings, and
Justice Vance
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed July 14, 1993
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