Opinion filed December 14, 2006

                                                                        In The

    Eleventh Court of Appeals

                                                                   __________

                                                          No. 11-05-00341-CR

                                                     __________

                                        LLOYD BROWN, Appellant

                                                             V.

                                        STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                                               On Appeal from the County Court

                                                          Martin County, Texas

                                                     Trial Court Cause No. 7856

                                                                   O P I N I O N

Lloyd Brown, appellant, appeals his conviction by a jury of the offense of assault by intentionally and knowingly causing bodily injury.  The trial court assessed his punishment at confinement in the Martin County jail for 120 days.  Appellant contends in three issues that (1) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction, (2) his due process rights were violated because he was convicted solely on lack of evidence and because he was twice put in jeopardy in that the trial court had previously granted a mistrial after evidence had been received, and (3) the State=s prosecutor made improper remarks in closing argument.  We affirm.

Appellant urges in issue one that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction.  In a legal sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and then determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).  To determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, the appellate court reviews all of the evidence in a neutral light.  Watson v. State, 2006 WL 2956272, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2006) (overruling in part Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 10-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).  Then, the reviewing court determines whether the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the conflicting evidence.  Watson, 2006 WL 2956272, at *8;  Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 10-11.

Teresa Brown, appellant=s sister, testified that, while she was finishing up paperwork with the driver of her moving truck, appellant came in, started cursing the driver, and told him that he needed to go move his truck.  Teresa said she responded that the paperwork was almost complete. She related that, after the conversation continued in this way, appellant hit her on the side of her head with his fist.  She said that he hit her pretty hard, causing her pain, and that she was still in pain at times.  She stated that she gets real bad headaches.

Jerry Heflin, a deputy sheriff for Martin County, testified that the sheriff=s department received two calls on the same day, one from Teresa Brown and one from appellant.  He said appellant was complaining about a truck blocking the road, while Teresa was complaining about appellant hitting her.  He said while he was not sure, he thought that Teresa had a knot on her head on the left side.  He acknowledged that he had not witnessed the assault.  He said he took no photographs of the knot.  He also stated that there was no blood and no big cuts.  He testified that the truck driver told him that he did not know whether appellant hit Teresa or pushed her.

Appellant=s exhibit one is a business record from the Martin County Hospital relating to Teresa=s visit to the emergency room.  It appears to reflect that there was no bruising on Teresa=s head and that Teresa was treated for a head injury.

    We hold that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, that the evidence is not so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, and that the verdict is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.  Consequently, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant=s conviction.  Appellant=s contention that his sister=s testimony was not credible because Deputy Heflin saw no injury is belied by Deputy Heflin=s testimony that he saw a knot on Teresa=s head.  We also note that, while the medical record is to some degree illegible, it does appear that Teresa was treated for a head injury.  Even if Deputy Heflin had not observed a knot, appellant has presented us with no authority that a victim=s injury must be physically observable, and we are not aware of any.  We overrule issue one. 

 Appellant insists in issue two that there was a violation of his due process rights because he was convicted without evidence and because the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss since the trial court had previously granted a mistrial after evidence had already been received, resulting in his being twice put in jeopardy for the same alleged offense.  We have found that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant=s conviction.  Appellant has presented no record reference to anything supporting his double jeopardy claim, and we are not aware of anything in the record that would support his claim.  We overrule issue two. 

Appellant suggests in issue three that the prosecutor=s argument that the case was proved beyond a reasonable doubt was improper.  In his closing argument, the State argued, without objection, that the evidence Aproves this case beyond a reasonable doubt.@  As appellant notes in his brief, an argument with respect to reasonable deductions from evidence is proper.  The suggestion by the prosecutor that the evidence proves the case beyond a reasonable doubt is a reasonable deduction from the evidence.  Consequently, the State=s argument was proper.  We also note that in the absence of an objection, nothing is presented for review.  Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).  We overrule issue three. 

The judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM

December 14, 2006

Do not publish.  See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of:  Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Hill, J.^[1]