Opinion filed July 13, 2006

                                                                        In The

    Eleventh Court of Appeals

                                                                   __________

                                                          No. 11-05-00256-CR

                                                     __________

                                    JOSE ANGEL ROSAS, Appellant

                                                             V.

                                        STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                                        On Appeal from the 282nd District Court

                                                          Dallas County, Texas

                                            Trial Court Cause No. F-0455768-LS

                                                                   O P I N I O N

Jose Angel Rosas pleaded not guilty to the charge of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle as alleged in the indictment. The jury found him guilty.  The indictment also alleged two enhancement paragraphs for two prior felonies.  Appellant pleaded true to these two paragraphs, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.  We affirm.

Background Facts

Appellant was indicted for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle belonging to Anyelo Ramirez.  Ramirez testified that he first noticed his 1995 Plymouth minivan was missing in the early morning hours of September 3, 2004.  He had parked the minivan in the street outside his apartment after driving it home from work around 11:30 p.m.  Ramirez testified that, when he got up to use the restroom around 1:00 a.m., he noticed the minivan was missing.  He called the police and gave them a description of the minivan along with the license plate number and the VIN.  Around 4:30 a.m., Ramirez was notified that the police had found his minivan.  He went with the police to identify the minivan and to determine if he knew the driver.  Ramirez was able to identify the minivan but did not know the driver.  He testified that he did not give the driver his consent to use the minivan. Ramirez observed that the passenger side window of the minivan was broken and that glass was on the passenger seat and the floorboard.

                                                                  Issue on Appeal

In appellant=s sole issue on appeal, he asserts that the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction because when viewed in a neutral light a rational juror could have a reasonable doubt regarding whether appellant reasonably believed he had the owner=s consent. 

Standard of Review

To determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we must view the evidence in a neutral light.  Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).  We will set aside the verdict only if the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or if the contrary evidence is so strong that the standard or proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been met.  Id. at 481.  Deference is given to the jury verdict and to the determination of the credibility and demeanor of the witness.  Id. at 481.

Is the Evidence Factually Sufficient?

A person commits the offense of unauthorized use of motor vehicle if the person intentionally or knowingly operates another=s motor vehicle without the effective consent of the owner.  Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 31.07(a) (Vernon 2003).  Appellant raises the defense of mistake of fact. AIt is a defense to prosecution that the actor through mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact if his mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense.@  Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 8.02(a) (Vernon 2003).  Whether or not appellant=s mistaken belief is reasonable is a issue for the trier of fact to decide.  Granger v. State, 3 S.W.3d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 

Appellant challenges the lack of consent element of the offense. He contends that he had the consent from the person he thought owned the minivan.   Appellant testified at trial that he believed the owner to be a man named Gordo.  He further testified that Gordo had a key to the minivan and let him borrow the minivan in exchange for Atwo dimes@ of cocaine.  Appellant said Gordo told him that the passenger window was broken, and appellant observed broken glass on the passenger seat and floorboard.  Appellant testified that he did not find the broken window suspicious.  Appellant testified that he did not know Gordo=s last name or his exact address but knew he lived down the street from appellant.  Appellant testified that he did not know Gordo that well but knew he was a Adoper.@  Gordo did not testify at trial because appellant said he could not locate him.  Officer Randy Mike Williams testified that the minivan was first spotted about one mile from Ramirez=s apartment, the place it was stolen.  Officer Williams identified appellant as the person driving the minivan when he stopped it.  Appellant testified that he started driving the minivan after 11:30 pm and that he drove the minivan for about three to four hours before being stopped by the police.  Appellant testified that he wanted to borrow the minivan in order to go to his girlfriend=s dad=s house and get money to bail his girlfriend out of jail.  Appellant did not know where the dad lived and did not go to the house.  Appellant=s testimony was the only support offered for his defense of mistake of fact. Further, appellant testified that he had been convicted of burglary of a building,  felony theft, and six burglaries of a motor vehicle.

The jury was free to reject appellant=s contention that he believed that the owner of the minivan was Gordo and that he had Gordo=s consent to operate the minivan.  See McQueen v. State, 781 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).  The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony and is free to accept one version of the facts and reject another.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.13 (Vernon 1981).  Appellant was unable to provide any identifying information regarding Gordo, thus, making his story less believable. 

Appellant was first seen driving the minivan about one mile from the place it was stolen.  The time frame that appellant was in possession of the minivan fits the time frame of when it was stolen.  Viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we determine that the evidence supporting guilt is not so weak as to render the conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle clearly wrong and manifestly unjust and that the evidence supporting guilt is not so greatly outweighed by the overwhelming weight of the contrary evidence as to render the conviction clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.  Appellant=s issue on appeal is overruled.

Conclusion

The trial court=s judgment is affirmed.

RICK STRANGE       

JUSTICE

July 13, 2006

Do not publish.  See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of:  Wright, C.J., and

McCall, J., and Strange, J.