Opinion filed March 9, 2006

                                                                        In The

    Eleventh Court of Appeals

                                                                 ____________

                                                          No. 11-04-00257-CR

                                                     __________

                              LYNN  LEVERT  SPRAGLIN, Appellant

                                                             V.

                                        STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                                         On Appeal from the 238th District Court

                                                        Midland County, Texas

                                                 Trial Court Cause No. CR29272

                                                                   O P I N I O N

The jury convicted Lynn Levert Spraglin of the offense of murder and assessed his pun-ishment at confinement for life and a $10,000 fine.  We affirm. 

In his sole issue on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to include in the jury charge his requested instruction on circumstantial evidence.  Appellant requested the following instruction:

To be sufficient in law to justify a conviction, admissible evidence adduced must show directly or circumstantially or support a rational inference of the facts to be proved from which the trier of fact could fairly be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the Defendant=s guilt of the offense charged. 

Appellant objected to the lack of a pre-Geesa^[1] charge that distinguishes a circumstantial evidence case from a direct evidence case.  The trial court denied appellant=s request and overruled his objection.

Appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence instruction is again appropriate in light of the fact that the Court of Criminal Appeals has overruled Geesa.  See Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  The court in Paulson overruled Geesa only to the extent that it required trial courts to include a definition of Abeyond a reasonable doubt@ in the jury charge.  Paulson, 28 S.W.3d at 573.  Paulson did not revive the circumstantial evidence charge that was abrogated by Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).  See Torres v. State, 141 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. App.CEl Paso 2004, pet. ref=d).  Nor did Paulson revive the Areasonable hypothesis of guilt analytical construct@ that, prior to Geesa, was applied in circumstantial evidence cases when the sufficiency of the evidence was challenged on appeal.  See Garcia v. State, 150 S.W.3d 598, 605 (Tex. App.CSan Antonio 2004, no pet.); Zavala v. State, 89 S.W.3d 134, 139 (Tex. App.CCorpus Christi 2002, no pet.).  We overrule appellant=s sole issue. 

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

RICK STRANGE

JUSTICE

March 9, 2006

Do not publish.  See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of:  Wright, C.J., and

McCall, J., and Strange, J.