Opinion filed March 9, 2006

                                                                        In The

    Eleventh Court of Appeals

                                                                 ____________

                                                          No. 11-04-00249-CR

                                                    __________

                         CHARLES FRANKLIN HAMAKER, Appellant

                                                             V.

                                        STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                                         On Appeal from the 266th District Court

                                                           Erath County, Texas

                                                Trial Court Cause No. CR 11600

                                                                    O P I N I O N

The jury convicted Charles Franklin Hamaker of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams and assessed punishment at seventy-five years confinement.  We affirm.

In two points of error, appellant argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction.  In order to determine if the evidence is legally sufficient, we must review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  In order to determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we must review all of the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether the evidence supporting guilt is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the evidence contrary to the verdict is so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof could not have been met.  Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ross v. State, 133 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).  We review the fact-finder=s weighing of the evidence and cannot substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.  Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 407; Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 135.  Due deference must be given to the jury=s determination, particularly concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence.  Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).  This court has the authority to disagree with the fact-finder=s determination Aonly when the record clearly indicates such a step is necessary to arrest the occurrence of a manifest injustice.@  Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 9.

Gregory Wayne Stewart testified that he is an investigator with the Erath County Sheriff=s Department and that he is assigned to the S.T.O.P. Narcotics Task Force.  On September 5, 2002, Deputy Stewart met with Michael Dwayne Martin who described illegal activity at a business in Stephenville.  Deputy Stewart verified the information and obtained a search warrant for the business, Floors & More.  Deputy Stewart and other officers executed the search warrant the following day.  Appellant was not present when the officers arrived to execute the search warrant.

Floors & More was a large warehouse building with smaller offices inside.  The officers asked an employee of Floors & More to contact the owner to come and unlock a locked office in the building.   Appellant, the owner of Floors & More, arrived and unlocked the office.  Inside of the office, Deputy Stewart found a black bag, and located inside of the black bag were smaller plastic baggies containing methamphetamine.  The black bag also contained scales and a small glass vial. Deputy Stewart also found a soft-side cooler inside of the locked office.  Located inside of the cooler were small plastic baggies containing methamphetamine.  Deputy Stewart found a lockbox inside of a desk in the reception area.  Deputy Stewart said that the lockbox contained marihuana.  The methamphetamine seized from the locked office inside of Floors & More had a total weight of 130.04 grams.

Deputy Stewart further testified at trial that appellant failed to appear for his trial scheduled on March 22, 2004.  Deputy Stewart located appellant in Euless, Texas, on April 1, 2004.  Appellant told Deputy Stewart that he left town because he was Aspooked@ by some of the evidence against him.

Gerald Wayne Rogers, a deputy with the Somervell County Sheriff=s Office formerly assigned to the S.T.O.P. Narcotics Task Force, testified at trial that he arrived at Floors & More after police had entered and begun the search of the store.  Deputy Rogers stated that he sat with appellant while the search was being conducted.    Deputy Rogers was with appellant when Deputy Stewart found the soft-side cooler containing the smaller plastic baggies of methamphetamine.  When Deputy Stewart brought the cooler to show Deputy Rogers, appellant stated, AI thought they=d already found that.@  

Michael Dwayne Martin testified at trial that he had previously worked for appellant installing floors.  Michael stated that appellant refused to pay him $500 after the completion of a job.  When he went to Floors & More for payment, Michael and appellant had a Arun-in.@  Michael stated that, while he was at the store seeking payment, he observed drug activity.   Michael further stated that he had witnessed drug use at the store on many occasions.  Michael was angry because appellant would not pay him for the job, and he reported the drug use to members of the S.T.O.P. Narcotics Task Force.

Derrick Martin testified that he worked for appellant at Floors & More.  Derrick stated that he had never seen appellant use methamphetamine.  Derrick said that he observed Michael arguing with appellant and then telling appellant that he would Abe sorry for this.@

Valarie Hamaker, appellant=s wife, testified at trial that Michael and appellant argued because  appellant did not pay Michael for his work.  Appellant told Michael that the customer was not satisfied with the job and that he would not pay Michael until the customer was satisfied.  Valarie stated that Michael threatened appellant.   Valarie testified that she has never known appellant to use illegal drugs and that she has never seen illegal drugs at their home or at Floors & More.

Appellant specifically argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish that appellant delivered methamphetamine.  The jury found appellant guilty of the offense of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams as charged in the indictment.  TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. ' 481.112(a) (Vernon 2003).

Intent to deliver can be proven by circumstantial evidence.  Ingram v. State, 124 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex. App.CEastland 2003, no pet.).  Inferences can be made from the conduct of the defendant as well as the amount of the controlled substance possessed and the manner in which it was possessed.  Id.; Rhodes v. State, 913 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 1995), aff=d, 945 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Puente v. State, 888 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.CSan Antonio 1994, no pet.).  Courts have considered several factors in determining intent, including the following:  (1) the nature of the location where the defendant was arrested; (2) the quantity of drugs the defendant possessed; (3) the manner of packaging of the drugs; (4) the presence or absence of drug paraphernalia (for use or sale); (5) whether the defendant possessed a large amount of cash in addition to the drugs; and (6) the defendant=s status as a drug user.  Jordan v. State, 139 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 2004, no pet.).  Intent is a question of fact and must be determined by the trier of fact.  Ingram, 124 S.W.3d at 676.

The record shows that officers found a large quantity of methamphetamine in the locked office of a business owned by appellant.  Appellant arrived at the scene and unlocked the office.  There was evidence that appellant exercised complete control over the locked office and that only appellant, his wife, and his father had a key to that office.  The evidence shows that the officers found scales inside of the locked office and methamphetamine packaged in small plastic baggies. We find that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support appellant=s conviction.  Appellant=s first and second points of error are overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

JIM R. WRIGHT

March 9, 2006                                                                         CHIEF JUSTICE

Do not publish.  See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., and

McCall, J., and Strange, J.