Affirmed and Majority and Concurring Memorandum Opinions filed October 3, 2006.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-05-00680-CR

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WAYNE MARK ARMELIN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 232nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1029992

M A J O R I T Y   M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

A jury convicted appellant, Wayne Mark Armelin, of the offense of stalking.  Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 42.072 (Vernon 2003).  The jury sentenced appellant to two and a half years= confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division and a $10,000 fine.  In appellant=s sole point of error, he contends the trial court committed reversible error when it violated appellant=s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and cross-examination by excluding evidence that would discredit the complainant=s credibility.  We affirm. 

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant and complainant Vicki Evans began dating off and on around April 2000.  Approximately four years later, in June 2004, Evans broke the relationship off completely and moved out of the apartment she shared with appellant.  Shortly after Evans ended the relationship, appellant began stalking her.  From August through September 2004, appellant flattened both Evans= and her daughter=s tires on multiple occasions, left threatening notes, wandered around Evans= apartment complex, and followed her to work.  The State indicted appellant for incidents occurring in 2004 on August 12, August 14, August 20, September 9, and September 26.  During its case in chief, the State presented testimony from multiple witnesses about each incident alleged in the indictment.  The jury found appellant guilty as charged in the indictment. 

Discussion

In appellant=s sole point of error, he argues the trial court committed reversible error when it violated appellant=s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and cross-examination by excluding evidence that would discredit the complainant.  The State contends appellant=s argument at trial does not comport with his argument on appeal, and therefore, appellant waived any error by the trial court in the exclusion of evidence.  We agree.

In order to properly preserve error on exclusion of evidence grounds, the proponent is required to object, obtain a ruling from the trial court or object to the trial court=s refusal to rule, and make an offer of proof.  Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1), (2); Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The proponent must also state the grounds for the ruling he desires Awith sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint.@  Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Tex. R. App. P. 33.1).  At the earliest opportunity, the proponent should have done everything necessary to bring to the judge=s attention the evidence rule or statute in question and its precise application to the evidence in question.  Id.  When a single objection Aencompasses complaints under both the Texas Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, the objection is not sufficiently specific to preserve error.@ Id. at 179 (citing Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 634 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)).  The same rationale applies equally to proffers of evidence and objections.  Id.

In Reyna v. State, Reyna, charged with indecency with a child, sought to cross examine the victim about a false allegation of sexual abuse she made against another man in 1995.  Id. at 174.  The trial court excluded the evidence, so Reyna objected, made an offer or proof, and obtained a ruling.  Id. at 175. In his offer of proof, he argued the evidence should have been admitted to prove the credibility of the victim.  Id. at 179.  On appeal, Reyna argued the exclusion of evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.  Id. at 175.  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held Reyna waived review of the confrontation issue because Reyna=s credibility argument could have referred to either the Rules of Evidence or the Confrontation Clause, and he did not clearly articulate his demand for admission.  Id. at 179.  Therefore, the judge never had the opportunity to specifically rule on the Confrontation Clause demand.  Id.

The facts in this case are parallel to those in Reyna.  Before the presentation of Rita Jo Deshayes= testimony, the trial court granted the State=s Motion in Limine with respect to testimony from Deshayes about conduct of the complainant in 2002.  Appellant objected and reserved the right to make a bill of exception.  In the bill of exception, appellant argued the evidence should have been admitted Abecause it would have gone to the weight, reliability and the credibility of the complainant.@  Just as in Reyna, when appellant generally argued the evidence was necessary for credibility purposes, he could have been referring to either the Rules of Evidence or the Confrontation Clause.  Appellant did not argue with enough specificity to make the trial court aware of his confrontation argument and consequently failed to preserve the issue for appeal. 

Therefore, we overrule appellant=s sole point of error and affirm the judgement of the trial court.

/s/      John S. Anderson

Justice

Judgment rendered and Majority and Concurring Memorandum Opinions filed October 3, 2006.

Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Edelman, and Frost. (Frost, J. Concurring).

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).