MAJORITY OPINION

Warwick Towers Council of Co-Owners (the “Council”) by and through St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (“St. Paul”) appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of Park Warwick L.P., Park Warwick Investments, L.L.C., and Park Hotel Investments, L.L.C. (“appel-lees”) on numerous grounds. We affirm.

As relevant to this appeal, the Council and St. Paul sued appellees for property damage the Council suffered when flood waters from Tropical Storm Allison allegedly flowed into the loading dock of the Warwick Hotel, owned by ap-pellees, and then traveled through an underground tunnel to the Warwick Towers condominium property. The Council asserted causes of action for negligence, trespass, and nuisance; and St. Paul, the Council’s insurance carrier, asserted a claim for subrogation1 to recover the amount it had paid on the Council’s policy claims.

After appellees obtained a partial summary judgment against the Council’s claims for trespass and nuisance (but not negligence), and against all of St. Paul’s claims , (based on a waiver of subrogation), the Council moved to dismiss all of its claims against appellees with prejudice, and the resulting order of dismissal caused the previous partial summary judgment against St. Paul’s claims to become final.

A notice of appeal was thereafter filed solely in the name of the Council that did not in any way refer to St. Paul or otherwise purport to be filed by, on behalf of, or with St. Paul; and no other notice of appeal or amended notice of appeal was filed by or on behalf of the Council or St. Paul.2 However, beginning with their subsequent agreed motion to abate the appeal (pending supplementation of the clerk’s record), appellant has been denominated as, “Warwick Towers Council of Co-Owners by and through St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company.”

An appellate court may not grant a party who fails to file a notice of appeal more favorable relief than did the trial court except for just cause. Tex.R.App. P. 25.1(c). Although the circumstances constituting “just cause” are not addressed in rule 25.1 and have not been developed in the case law, Texas appeals courts have uniformly declined to afford relief to parties who have not filed a notice of appeal and make no showing of just cause.3 Simi*151larly, an appealing party may not complain of errors that do not injuriously affect it or that merely affect the rights of others. Tonington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 848 (Tex. 2000).

To whatever extent this case might have been brought solely in the name of the Council, either by it or by St. Paul in the name of the Council,4 it was not brought in that way. Instead, the Council and St. Paul each expressly sued in its own name as a co-plaintiff. St. Paul sought recovery of only the portion of the alleged damages that were subject to its right of subrogation. Judgment was entered against the Council’s claims based on its motion to dismiss, whereas judgment was entered against St. Paul’s claims based on appellees’ partial summary judgment. The record does not reflect that the judgment entered against the Council’s claims affected those asserted by St. Paul5 or vice versa. Nor is there any indication or contention that St. Paul subsequently obtained any further interest in the claims asserted by the Council.6

Because the Council and St. Paul were independent parties in the trial court, and because the trial court’s judgment, entered against each of them on independent grounds, did not affect the rights of the other, it logically follows that neither was adversely affected by the judgment against the other, and, thus, neither had standing to appeal the judgment entered against the other. Under these circumstances, the notice of appeal filed solely and unambiguously in the name of the Council and without any reference to St. Paul, can relate only to the portion of the judgment that disposed of claims asserted by the Council, and not to its disposition of claims asserted by other parties, such as St. Paul. A contrary interpretation would suggest that a notice of appeal filed in the name of any single party would apply to any or all other co-parties and thereby render rule 25.1(c) meaningless.7 Moreover, although a defect in a notice of appeal may be corrected by amendment,8 the notice of appeal filed for the Council is not defective, and no amendment was filed in any event.9

Because our record does not reflect that a notice of appeal was filed for St. Paul, *152and the record does not contain a showing of good cause to grant St. Paul more favorable relief than did the trial court, we have no authority to do so. Accordingly, we do not reach the issues presented by St. Paul, and the judgment against it is affirmed.

SEYMORE, J., concurring.

concurring.

Our Supreme Court does not foster appellate disposition based on procedural defects when parties have not been afforded opportunity to amend under Rule 44.3, Tex.R.App. P. The majority has disposed of this case by identifying a procedural defect which was not raised or briefed by the parties. I respectfully submit that an opinion without citations to authority supporting the essential reason for disposition is of no moment.

As an insuror and subrogee, St. Paul is asserting uncontested contractual or equitable subrogation rights. St. Paul is entitled to disposition of the issues presented in its appellate brief. Accordingly, I concur in the result only because I would affirm if this case were considered on the merits.