David Wayne Rosson appeals from the order placing him on deferred adjudication for the offense of indecency with a child. We dismiss Rosson's appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The trial court filed a certification, in accordance with Rule 25.2(a)(2), that Rosson "waived the right of appeal." Rule 25.2(a)(2) states, in pertinent part:

(2) . . . A defendant in a criminal case has the right of appeal under Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.02 and these rules. The trial court shall enter a certification of the defendant's right of appeal in every case in which it enters a judgment of guilt or other appealable order.

Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). If a certification showing that the defendant has the right of appeal is not made a part of the appellate record, we must dismiss the case unless the record affirmatively indicates that an appellant may have the right of appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d); see Greenwell v. Court of Appeals for Thirteenth Judicial Dist., 159 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We have examined the clerk's record to determine whether the trial court's certification is defective. See Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 613. Nothing in the record indicates the certification is defective. This Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. ⁽¹⁾

We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Jack Carter

Justice

Date Submitted: January 29, 2007

Date Decided: January 30, 2007

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1. The negotiated plea agreement in this case demonstrates that Rosson's waiver of appeal was done knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See Ex parte Delaney, 207 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ("One way to indicate that the waiver was knowing and intelligent is for the actual punishment or maximum punishment to have been determined by a plea agreement when the waiver was made.").

allowing Ridgeway to testify.

We affirm the judgment.

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: January 2, 2003

Date Decided: February 6, 2003

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