Opinion issued April 17, 2008    

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

SUSANA A. BRIGGS, GODSON S. BRIGGS, AND MOSEBA BRIGGS, Appellants

V.

LATARSHA BRIGGS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 80th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2006-54180

MEMORANDUM OPINION

  This is a dispute over the designation of a beneficiary for the proceeds of a 401k plan.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Latarsha Briggs (“Mrs. Briggs”), the wife of the decedent and the named beneficiary of the proceeds.  We affirm.

Background

Following the death of Dr. Tam Briggs in April 2006, appellants Susana Briggs, Godson Briggs, and Moseba Briggs (collectively, “the family”), challenged Mrs. Briggs’s status as proper beneficiary of the decedent’s  401k  plan, containing funds currently held by the Harris County Hospital District.  As a result, the District refused payment to any of the claimants.  Mrs. Briggs instituted this action, seeking a declaration that she is entitled to the monies accrued by Mr. Briggs in the 401k plan. 

In their brief, the family recites that the decedent lived in the United States but was a native of Nigeria.  They assert that the decedent was wed to Iyaritariya Asemebo in Nigeria and that the marriage was not terminated before his 1997 marriage to Mrs. Briggs.  Rather, he continued his relationship with Iyaritariya when he visited Nigeria. 

The record reflects that in 1998, Dr. Briggs designated the following individuals as the primary beneficiaries of his 401k plan:  Godson, Awoba, Senibo, and Moseba Briggs and Ronald Newton.  Mrs. Briggs was designated contingent beneficiary, and signed the requisite spousal consent for his designations.  According to the consent statement, her consent was irrevocable unless Dr. Briggs revoked the beneficiary designation.  In late 2000, Dr. Briggs executed a new beneficiary designation, making Godson Briggs his sole primary beneficiary and making Mrs. Briggs his contingent beneficiary.  On March 11, 2006, less than a month before he died, Dr. Briggs executed a third beneficiary designation, making Mrs. Briggs the primary beneficiary and Senibo Briggs his contingent beneficiary.    

Mrs. Briggs moved for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) Mrs. Briggs did not consent in writing to the 2000 designation of Godson Briggs as primary beneficiary before a notary public or plan representative as required by the law and the 401k plan language, and thus the designation is invalid; (2) Dr. Brigg’s 2006 designation of Mrs. Briggs as primary beneficiary is valid as a matter of law; and (3) the family has no evidence that Dr. Briggs lacked mental capacity or was unduly influenced, or that his signature was a forgery.  The trial court granted summary judgment on Mrs. Briggs’s motion and declared that Mrs. Briggs is entitled to the 401k plan proceeds.  In seven issues, the family contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. 

Discussion

We do not reach the merits of this case because the family failed to properly brief their issues on appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h).  We observe that the trial court did not specify the grounds on which it granted summary judgment.  The family’s brief cites general error in granting summary judgment as an issue on appeal and recites the standard of review for a grant of summary judgment under Rule 166a(c).  It does not, however, contain any specific challenge to the Rule 166a(c) grounds asserted by Mrs. Briggs in her motion for summary judgment.  “[W]hen a summary judgment motion alleges multiple grounds and the order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground on which the summary judgment was rendered, the appellant must challenge and negate all summary judgment grounds on appeal.”  Britton v. Tex. Dept. of Crim. Justice, 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (citing Ellis v. Precision Engine Rebuilders, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)).  “If summary judgment may have been rendered, properly or improperly, on a ground not challenged, the judgment must be affirmed.”  Ellis, 68 S.W.3d at 898.  The family waived its issue challenging the grant of summary judgment under Rule 166a(c) by failing to present any specific contentions, supported by citation to appropriate authorities, concerning the grounds urged under that rule.  See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h).  Each of the first two grounds set forth in Mrs. Briggs’s summary judgment motion provides an independent ground for affirmance of the trial court’s judgment in its entirety.  In the absence of a challenge to those grounds, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Conclusion

          We conclude that the family has waived its right to appeal the trial court’s summary judgment as to certain grounds, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jane Bland

                                                Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Bland.