Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 2008

Hector Becerra, Jr. v. State

Hector Becerra, Jr. v. State
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas · Decided February 7, 2008

Hector Becerra, Jr. v. State

Opinion

Opinion issued February 7, 2008

























In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas




NO. 01-06-00840-CR

__________



HECTOR BECERRA, JR., Appellant



V.



THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee




On Appeal from the 23rd District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 50,848




MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Hector Becerra, Jr., was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child. In his sole appellate point, appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm.

Ineffective Assistance

A jury found appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child (1) and assessed punishment at 40-years confinement. On appeal, appellant claims that, based on the totality of the representation, his trial counsel was ineffective.

Standard of Review

In considering whether counsel's assistance was so ineffective that a reversal of the conviction is warranted, we follow the standard enunciated in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 770 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Under the Strickland standard, we determine (1) whether counsel's performance was deficient and (2) whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068.

Analysis

We need not address the merits of his ineffective assistance claim, because appellant has failed to specifically address prejudice under Strickland's second prong. The only parts in his brief which arguably bear on prejudice are statements that the prejudicial effects of the elicited testimony are "unmeasured," "disastrous," and "overwhelming," and that, in his closing argument, "counsel acknowledges that the prior allegations are damning to the defense without acknowledging that he is the one that [sic] put them in front of the jury." These assertions, however, are not proof that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Failure to provide proof of prejudice precludes relief. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We therefore overrule appellant's issue. Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.



George C. Hanks, Jr.

Justice



Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Hanks, Higley.Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

1. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.021 (Vernon Supp. 2007).

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