T. Christopher Robson v. Garrett Gilbreath and David Gilbreath
Opinion
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
NO. 03-06-00364-CV T. Christopher Robson, Appellant v.
Garrett Gilbreath and David Gilbreath, Appellees FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1-GN-04-002474, HONORABLE DARLENE BYRNE, JUDGE PRESIDING
DISSENTING OPINION Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court sanctioned plaintiffs’ counsel T. Christopher Robson for failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry prior to filing suit. Because the trial court did not have evidence from which it could make required findings that Robson brought suit in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment, I would hold that there was no evidence from which the trial court could exercise its discretion and reverse the trial court’s order.1 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Because the majority fails to adequately address the procedural and substantive requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13, I begin with a review of the rule and its requirements. Rule 13 authorizes a court to sanction a party or his counsel if a party files a pleading that is either (1) groundless and brought in bad faith or (2) groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment. Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; Elkins v. Stotts-Brown, 103 S.W.3d 664, 668 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Monroe v. Grider, 884 S.W.2d 811, 817 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied). “If a pleading, motion or other paper is filed in violation of [Rule 13], the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, after notice and hearing, shall impose an appropriate sanction available under Rule [of Civil Procedure] 215, upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 13. No sanctions may be imposed under Rule 13 “except for good cause, the particulars of which must be stated in the sanction order.” Id.
Pursuant to Rule 13, pleadings are presumed filed in good faith, and the burden is on the moving party to show a pleading was groundless and brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; Emmons v. Purser, 973 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). To show bad faith, the moving party must present evidence of the “conscious doing of a wrong for dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purpose.” See Mattly v. Spiegel, Inc., 19 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (citation omitted). Bad faith is more than “bad judgment or negligence.” Id. “Harass” is used “to describe words, gestures, and actions that tend to annoy, alarm, and verbally abuse another person.” Elkins, 103 S.W.3d at 669 (citation omitted). Pleadings, standing alone, are not evidence of bad faith or harassment. Id.
Rule 13 requires the trial court “to base sanctions on the acts or omissions of the represented party or counsel” and, when determining whether sanctions are proper, the trial court must examine the facts that were available and the circumstances existing at the time the party filed the pleading. Id. at 668; Monroe, 884 S.W.2d at 817. Thus, the trial court under these circumstances must convene and conduct an evidentiary hearing. See Alejandro v. Robstown Indep. Sch. Dist., 131 S.W.3d 663, 669-70 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (“Rule 13 requires that the trial court provide notice and hold an evidentiary hearing to make the necessary factual determinations about the motives and credibility of the person filing the groundless pleading. . . . Without such a hearing, the trial court has no evidence before it to determine that a pleading was filed in bad faith or to harass.”) (internal citations omitted); Randolph v. Jackson Walker L.L.P., 29 S.W.3d 271, 277 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (“Because appellees had the burden to establish that sanctions were justified, it was ‘imperative for the trial court to convene and conduct an evidentiary hearing.’”) (citation omitted); Karagounis v. Property Co. of Am., 970 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (If the “rule of law requires the court to conduct a hearing and receive evidence before it can make a decision and the court does neither, then the court fails to do the things necessary to enable it to soundly exercise its discretion. The result is an abuse of discretion.”); Karlock v. Schattman, 894 S.W.2d 517, 523 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, orig. proceeding) (“Without hearing evidence on the circumstances surrounding the filing of the pleading signer’s credibility and motives, a trial court has no evidence to determine that a pleading was filed in bad faith or to harass.”); Cantu-McGarrahan v. Foote, No. 03-01-00506-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5404, at *10 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[R]ule 13 requires that a court hold an evidentiary hearing in order to make the necessary factual determinations about the motives and credibility of the persons signing the pleading in issue.”).2 In the context of Rule 13’s procedural and substantive requirements, I turn to the trial court’s sanctions against Robson.
In its order, the trial court states it was sanctioning Robson “because of the failure of Plaintiffs’ counsel to conduct a reasonable inquiry prior to filing suit.”3 Robson filed suit on behalf of Michael Woodworth, individually and as representative of the estate of Elizabeth Daley, in August 2004, against Garrett Gilbreath,4 the driver of an automobile involved in an accident that resulted in Daley’s death, alleging negligence, and against Garrett’s father, David Gilbreath, alleging negligent entrustment.5 Robson filed an amended petition in November 2004, retaining the negligent entrustment claim and adding additional plaintiffs. Mr. David Gilbreath, thereafter in August 2005, sought sanctions in a motion for partial summary judgment and motion for sanctions, asserting that the plaintiffs’ negligent entrustment claim was groundless. Mr. Gilbreath sought sanctions against plaintiffs’ counsel for “filing a groundless claim and/or for failing to nonsuit a groundless claim” against him. Mr. Gilbreath did not address the amount of sanctions that he was seeking or cite any authority for sanctions in his motion.6 At the sanctions hearing, neither party offered evidence7 but, at the end of the hearing, the trial court sanctioned Robson in the amount of $10,000 payable to Mr. Gilbreath.
Robson contends on appeal that even if this Court determines that the negligent entrustment claim was groundless and that his inquiry was not reasonable under the circumstances, Mr. Gilbreath offered no evidence that Robson filed the petitions in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. Assuming without deciding that the plaintiffs’ petitions alleging negligent entrustment were groundless, because Robson did not timely object to the form of the order or request more particularity in the order, the issue for this Court is whether there is evidence to support an implied finding that Robson filed the petitions in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. See Texas-Ohio Gas Inc. v. Mecom, 28 S.W.3d 129, 136, 139 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.); McCain v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 856 S.W.2d 751, 757 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ).
Without addressing (i) Rule 13’s presumption that pleadings are filed in good faith, (ii) Mr. Gilbreath’s burden, as the movant, to offer evidence that plaintiffs’ petitions were filed in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment, or (iii) the distinction between argument and evidence, the majority concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding bad faith.8 Because no evidence was offered at the hearing, however, there was no evidence from which the trial court could determine Robson’s motives. See McCain, 856 S.W.2d at 757 (“Motions and arguments of counsel are not evidence.”); see also Alejandro v. Bell, 84 S.W.3d 383, 393 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (“In order for the trial court to consider documents as evidence in a Rule 13 context, they must be admitted in compliance with the rules of evidence at the evidentiary hearing. . . . The letter was neither offered nor admitted into evidence.”).9
Without receiving evidence at the hearing of Robson’s motives at the time he filed the plaintiffs’ petitions, the trial court had no evidence to determine that Robson filed the petitions in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment.10 See GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 731 (Tex. 1993) (trial court abused discretion in awarding Rule 13 sanctions when no proof that party before filing pleading was aware of evidence discrediting pleading); Elkins, 103 S.W.3d at 669 (trial court abused discretion in granting Rule 13 sanctions when no evidence of motive in filing pleading; movant did not “put on any evidence at the hearing”); Alejandro, 84 S.W.3d at 393 (“Because appellee presented no evidence at the sanctions hearing from which the trial court could driving record and a copy of his son’s driver’s license—were sent after the petitions were already filed. Letters sent after the petitions were already filed are not evidence of Robson’s motives at the time the petitions were filed. See Karagounis v. Property Co. of Am., 970 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (trial court abused discretion in assessing Rule 13 sanctions against party for “continuing his suit once [the opposing party] provided him with evidence which allegedly rebutted his contentions. Yet, Rule 13, by its very words, only encompasses the initiation of a frivolous action for improper motive, not the continuation of a suit after it is shown to be baseless.”). Although Robson filed a petition in intervention on behalf of the dependent administrator of the estate of Elizabeth Daley in February 2006, which date was after he received the referenced letters from counsel, Mr. Gilbreath did not address or complain of the petition in intervention in his motion for sanctions; his motion for partial summary judgment and sanctions was filed in August 2005. In any event, the petition in intervention was filed prior to the depositions of Mr. Gilbreath and his son. See Emmons v. Purser, 973 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.) (“without sworn testimony absolving [the defendant],” refusing to adhere to numerous requests by opposing counsel to dismiss claims did not demonstrate bad faith or harassment). Mr. Gilbreath’s counsel demanded dismissal but, at the same time, he refused to allow the defendants’ depositions to proceed. The majority’s holding places counsel in an untenable position. Refusing to dismiss a claim may subject counsel to sanctions and, on the other hand, choosing to dismiss a claim without sworn testimony absolving the opposing party subjects counsel potentially to legal malpractice if it is later determined that the claim was viable. determine that appellant had filed his lawsuit in bad faith, we hold the trial court abused its discretion in assessing Rule 13 sanctions against appellant and his attorney.”). Because Mr. Gilbreath, as the movant, did not present evidence at the hearing that Robson filed the petitions in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment, there was no evidence from which the trial court could determine Robson violated Rule 13.11 See Alejandro, 84 S.W.3d at 393.
Because Mr. Gilbreath failed to offer evidence to overcome the presumption that Robson filed the petitions in good faith, I would conclude that there was no evidence from which the trial court could exercise its discretion to sanction Robson pursuant to Rule 13, and I would reverse the trial court’s order.12
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Jan P. Patterson, Justice
Before Justices Patterson, Pemberton and Waldrop Filed: August 1, 2008
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