On February 21, 2008, we notified the parties that the trial court's judgment in favor of Ron Risinger did not appear to be a final judgment because the trial court ordered separate trials of the interventions filed by Giddens and Richard Risinger rather than severing those claims. Giddens filed a response, in which he fails to establish that the trial court severed his claims from those of Richard Risinger.

Giddens's notice of appeal seeks to appeal the trial court's order that granted Ron Risinger's motion for directed verdict after trying only Giddens's claims against Ron Risinger. Before trying Giddens's case, the trial court ordered that Giddens's claims against Ron Risinger be tried separately from Richard Risinger's claims against Ron Risinger, thereby bifurcating the case.

"A judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it disposes of all pending parties and claims in the record, except as necessary to carry out the decree." Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001)(footnote omitted). The trial court did not sign an order of severance so as to make the otherwise interlocutory judgment in favor of Ron Risinger final for purposes of appeal. See In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., 209 S.W.3d 742, 745 (Tex. App.--Tyler 2006, orig. proceeding) (noting the distinction between severance, which divides the lawsuit into two or more separate and independent causes, from bifurcation, which leaves the lawsuit intact but enables the court to determine issues at separate hearings, and concluding that the order entered after a separate trial is often interlocutory.); In re Ben E. Keith Co., 198 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2006, orig. proceeding) (also noting the distinction between a severance, which results in a final, appealable judgment, and an order for separate trials, which often results in an interlocutory judgment); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 41 (authorizing severance); Tex. R. Civ. P. 174(b) (authorizing bifurcated trials). In addition, the trial court's judgment granting a directed verdict in favor of Ron Risinger does not contain clear language indicating that the trial court intended for it to dispose of all parties' claims. See generally Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192-93. The record before us does not indicate that the trial court has disposed of Richard Risinger's claims against Ron Risinger. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

STEVE McKEITHEN

Chief Justice

Submitted on December 12, 2007

Opinion Delivered April 10, 2008

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.