r.

      Point one asserts that the trial counsel's failure to subpoena willing, beneficial, and favorable witnesses for the penalty hearing amounted to constitutional ineffectiveness or incompetency, or both; that concomitantly, but for counsel's error of omission, a reasonable probability existed that the sentencing profile would have been altered, viz, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

      Under this point, Appellant asserts that he was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing and that the "totality of representation" at the sentencing hearing denied him effective assistance of counsel and entitles him to sentencing anew.

      In determining whether counsel was ineffective in the punishment phase of a criminal proceeding, we must examine the totality of counsel's representation of the accused. Cruz v. Stall, (Tex. Crim. App.) 739 S.W.2d 53, 58. The constitutional right to counsel does not mean errorless counsel. Cruz, supra. Trial strategy will be reviewed by an appellate court only if the record demonstrates that the action is without any plausible basis. Ex parte Ewing, (Tex. Crim. App.) 570 S.W.2d 941, 945.

      Appellant bears the burden of proving counsel's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound strategy. Moore v. State, (Tex. Crim. App.) 694 S.W.2d 528, 531.

      We will examine Appellant's specific claims of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Claim one alleges that trial counsel failed to read the presentence report. Appellant wholly fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that trial counsel did not read the presentence report. The record reflects that trial counsel did have a copy of such report.

      Claim two alleges that trial counsel failed to read the indictment and refers to point two which alleges the indictment did not confer jurisdiction. The indictment did confer jurisdiction. Studer v. State, (Tex. Crim. App.) 799 S.W.2d 263, 271. The record does not reflect that trial counsel did not read the indictment. The record does reflect that Appellant pled "guilty" to the indictment with trial counsel present.

      Claim three alleges that trial counsel failed to speak to and subpoena five named witnesses. The first four were acquainted with Appellant through Waldrip High School and the fifth was Appellant's physician. When trial counsel was retained by Appellant's family, he told them to get letters from different people, who knew Appellant, stating that he was a good person. Appellant's relatives spoke to each of the five named witnesses who submitted very favorable letters regarding appellant's character. These letters were presented to the trial court. Although counsel did not subpoena the five witnesses to testify at Appellant's sentencing hearing, that decision was a matter of trial strategy. Counsel testified at hearing on Appellant's motion for a new trial that he chose not to subpoena the five witnesses because the letters they wrote were very favorable and stood on their own. Had the witnesses been called to testify, the State would have had the opportunity to cross-examine them. The record here demonstrates a plausible basis for counsel's decision. Ex parte Ewing, supra. Although the five witnesses may have been available to testify at the sentencing hearing, Appellant has not shown that their testimony would have contained more favorable information than their letters already contained.

      Claim four alleges that trial counsel failed to prepare for the sentencing hearing. The record does not support this very general allegation.

      Claim five alleges that trial counsel gave a "meandering and incoherent" argument at the close of the sentencing hearing. Counsel argued that Appellant had never been in trouble before, that this was a case for leniency, that Appellant was very young and that Appellant should be given an opportunity to make a productive member of society. Without quoting counsel's complete argument, we find that it was a good and professional argument.

      We conclude that Appellant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that trial court counsel's representation constituted ineffective assistance. Point one is overruled.

      Point two asserts that the indictment did not confer jurisdiction on the trial court. The indictment, in pertinent part, read:

[Appellant] heretofore on or about October 1, 1991, did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing theft of property owned by Thomas Rangale and with intent to obtain and maintain control of the property, intentionally and knowingly threaten and place imminent bodily injury and death, and defendant did then and there use and exhibit a deadly weapon, to-wit, a firearm.

      The indictment tracked the statute in all things except it did not allege the phrase "Thomas Rangale in fear of" between the words "place" and "imminent" in the last few lines (see above).

      The indictment was sufficient to invest the trial court with jurisdiction. Studer, 799 S.W.2d at 271. Moreover Appellant, by pleading guilty, waived the error of which he now complains. Point two is overruled.

      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                     FRANK G. McDONALD

                                                                                     Chief Justice (Retired)

Before Justice Cummings,

      Justice Vance, and

      Chief Justice McDonald (Retired)

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed February 17, 1993

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