Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 22, 2008.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-07-00293-CR

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LEO JONES OUSLEY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 177^th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1049876

M E M O R A N D U M  O P I N I O N

Appellant was convicted of arson and sentenced to confinement for 25 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.  Appellant challenges his conviction, asserting that the evidence is factually insufficient to sustain the conviction.  We affirm.

     I.  Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant, Leo Jones Ousley, was in the custody of Harris County on December 10, 2005.  Appellant was assigned to a double-door lockdown area, where he was confined to a single-person cell.  After the facility nurse made morning rounds, Appellant became upset when he realized that he did not receive his prescribed medications.  He immediately began sending intercom messages to the security station, requesting his medications.  Upon receiving the messages, the deputy at the control panel contacted the clinic to investigate Appellant=s complaint. 

Appellant continued to send intercom messages requesting his medication, despite assurances from the deputy that he was working to resolve the problem.  The deputy testified that Appellant=s intercom messages escalated to the point where Appellant threatened to Aburn the [building] down@ and stated that if he did not receive his medications in five minutes, the officers Awould be smelling something.@  Within five minutes, security received notification that a fire alarm had been activated in Appellant=s cell block.  The deputy at the control panel sent other deputies to investigate.  One deputy testified that he saw a fire in Appellant=s cell with a base of nine to twelve inches and flames that were approximately fifteen inches high.  Appellant added additional combustible materials to the fire and threatened the deputies responding to the fire alarm.  Another deputy testified that he retrieved a fire extinguisher to put out the fire, at which time he saw that the fire had a twelve to sixteen inch base with flames that were approximately twelve to eighteen inches high. 

After extinguishing the fire and escorting Appellant away from the scene, two deputies examined Appellant=s cell and documented their findings with a digital camera.  Based on this investigation, the deputies testified that the fire started when two pieces of pencil lead were placed in each side of an electrical socket, and a third piece of pencil lead wrapped in toilet paper was used to cause a spark.

Appellant was tried before a jury and convicted of arson.  Appellant timely filed this appeal, asserting that the evidence is factual insufficient to sustain the conviction.  We affirm.

                                           II.  Issue and Analysis

When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party.  See Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).  Although not determinative, the existence of an alternative reasonable hypothesis may be relevant to a factual sufficiency review.   Wilson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Villani v. State, 116 S.W.3d 297, 304 (Tex. App.CHouston[14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref=d).   To reverse for lack of factual sufficiency, we must determine, with some objective basis in the record, that the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts the verdict.  Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 408.  We may set the verdict aside if: (1) the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust, or (2) the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 414-15.  However, our evaluation must not intrude upon the fact finder=s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility given to any witness=s testimony.  See Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).  We may not simply substitute our judgment for the judgment of the fact-finder.  Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  We cannot conclude that a conviction is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust simply because we would have decided the case differently than the jury or because we disagree with the jury=s resolution of a conflict in the evidence.  Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 410.    

In addressing factual sufficiency, the reviewing court generally includes a discussion of the most important and relevant evidence that supports the appellant=s complaint on appeal.  Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).  Moreover, a court reversing and remanding on factual insufficiency grounds must detail all the evidence and clearly state why the finding in question is factually insufficient.  Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 

A person commits arson if the person starts a fire with intent to destroy or damage a building.  Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 28.02 (Vernon 2005).  To establish the corpus delicti of arson, the state must produce evidence that someone designedly set the fire.  Id.  AThe essential element of the crime of arson is the wilful burning of the building, without which the crime has not been committed.  Proof merely that the building burned is not sufficient to establish that fact.  There must be some proof, direct or circumstantial, of the wilful burning of the building.@  Wheeler v. State, 35 S.W.3d 126, 134-35 (Tex. App.CTexarkana 2000, pet. ref=d) (citations omitted).  Although presence at the scene alone is insufficient to support a conviction, it may be sufficient when combined with other direct or circumstantial evidence.  Thomas v. State, 915 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref=d). The cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances may be sufficient to warrant a guilty verdict.  Id. at 600.

In the present case, Appellant asserts that the evidence merely showed that he was present at the scene of the fire, but that the evidence was factually insufficient to show that he started the fire with intent to destroy or damage the building.  Appellant points to the fact that the State was unable to present testimony from a witness who observed Appellant placing anything, including pencil lead, into the wall outlet in his cell.  Additionally, Appellant alludes to the alternative theory that another inmate could have placed pencil lead in the outlet before Appellant was confined to the cell.  Although Appellant argues that no witnesses observed him start the fire, circumstantial evidence can lead a rational jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant set a fire with the intent to damage or destroy.  See Wheeler, 35 S.W.3d at 136.  Further, the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances can be sufficient to warrant a conclusion of guilt.  Thomas, 915 S.W.2d at 599.

The jury heard testimony describing the double-door lockdown area, where Appellant was confined in a single-person cell.  The deputy at the control panel testified that after Appellant sent an intercom message requesting his medication, he sent further messages claiming that he was going to Aburn the [building] down,@ and that if he didn=t get his medication in five minutes then the deputy Awould be smelling something.@  A second deputy testified that he saw the fire, observed Appellant adding combustible materials to the fire, and noted the damage done to the structure after the fire.  This deputy also testified that the fire started from placing pencil lead into the wall outlet.  Additionally, the jury heard testimony from the shift supervisor who investigated the fire and took digital pictures of the scene.  The jury heard this witness testify as to his determination that the source of ignition for this fire was Appellant taking two pieces of pencil lead, placing them on each side of an electrical socket, and using a third piece of lead wrapped in toilet paper to cause a short circuit and a spark.  The jury also viewed pictures of the single-person cell, including a picture of the third piece of lead found on the ground near the outlet.  The jury heard testimony that if left inside an outlet for long enough, the lead could spontaneously combust.  However, the theory of spontaneous combustion ignores the third piece of lead found on the ground near the outlet, which the deputy testified was likely the source of conduction between the other two pieces of lead. 

After reviewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we find that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the conviction.

III.  Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court=s judgment.

/s/      Norman Lee

Senior Justice

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed April 22, 2008.

Panel consists of Justices Yates, Guzman, and Lee.^[1]

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).