COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 2-08-166-CR

CESAR LABRADA APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

------------

FROM THE 362ND DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION ^{(footnote: 1)}

------------

A jury convicted Appellant Cesar Labrada of indecency with a child and assessed his punishment at four years’ confinement.  The trial court sentenced him accordingly.

Labrada’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion.  Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief.  386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).  We gave Labrada an opportunity to file a pro se brief, but he did not file one.

Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders , this court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record .   See Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.).  Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.   See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief.  We agree with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal.   See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).  Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

PER CURIAM

PANEL:  MEIER, LIVINGSTON, and DAUPHINOT, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED:  June 18, 2009

FOOTNOTES

1:

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.