Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 2009

Douglas Rubins v. Texas Workforce Commission, Tom Paukin, L. A. Fuller & Sons Connstruction Co., LTD.

Douglas Rubins v. Texas Workforce Commission, Tom Paukin, L. A. Fuller & Sons Connstruction Co., LTD.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas · Decided June 5, 2009

Douglas Rubins v. Texas Workforce Commission, Tom Paukin, L. A. Fuller & Sons Connstruction Co., LTD.

Opinion

NO. 07-09-0109-CV


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


AT AMARILLO


PANEL C


JUNE 5, 2009


______________________________



DOUGLAS RUBINS, APPELLANT


V.


TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION, TOM PAUKEN,

AND L.A. FULLER & SONS CONST., CO., APPELLEES



_________________________________


FROM THE 108TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;


NO. 96,974-E; HONORABLE DOUGLAS WOODBURN, JUDGE


_______________________________


Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appellant, Douglas Rubins, proceeding pro se, filed this appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing, with prejudice, his case against Appellees, Texas Workforce Commission, Tom Pauken, and L.A. Fuller & Sons Const., Co. By letter from this Court dated April 14, 2009, Rubins was notified that among other items, a filing fee of $175 was due within ten days. In response, Rubins filed a motion for extension of time in which to pay the filing fee or, in lieu thereof, file an affidavit of indigence. The motion was granted to May 25, 2009, with a detailed explanation of the procedures and deadlines for either filing an affidavit of indigence or paying the filing fee. See Tex. R. App. P. 10.5(b), 20.1(c)(1) & (3). Rubins was also admonished that failure to either pay the required filing fee of $175 or file a compliant affidavit of indigence accompanied by a motion for extension of time might result in dismissal of this appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c). Rubins did not respond to this Court’s notice. Neither did he pay the required filing fee or file an affidavit of indigence.

          In response to a motion for extension of time in which to file the clerk’s record for nonpayment, this Court abated the request pending Rubins’s compliance with the Court’s directive. Rubins’s failure to comply with the Court’s directive renders the clerk’s request for an extension of time moot.

          Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for failure to comply with an order of this Court. Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c).

                                                                           Patrick A. Pirtle

                                                                                 Justice

not find that appellant was egregiously harmed by the purported error.

Issue Three - Order Requiring Sentences to Run Consecutively

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in entering an order wherein it "stacked" appellant's sentences. In other words, appellant would be required to serve the six sentences consecutively as opposed to concurrently. The State concedes this point and asks us to reform the six judgments. We agree and sustain the issue.

Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are reformed to delete the accumulation orders. Robbins v. State, 914 S. W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). As reformed, the judgments of the trial court are in all other respects affirmed.



Brian Quinn

Chief Justice



Publish.

1. Appellant does not raise Texas Rule of Evidence 403.

2. The trial court charged the jury as follows: "'abduct' means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his/her liberation by using or threatening to use deadly force." So too did it state that "'restrain' means to restrict a person's movements without consent, so as to interfere substantially with the person's liberty, by moving the person from one place to another or by confining the person." Through the application paragraph, it then informed the jury of the following:



. . . if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 12th day of March, 2006 in Wheeler County, Texas, [appellant], did then and there, intentionally or knowingly abduct []Maddox, by restricting the movements. . . by confining him, with the intent to prevent [] liberation, secreting or holding [] in a place where [] was not likely to be found, and [appellant] did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, to wit: a gun, during the commission of said offense, . . . .

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.