Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, appellant Layla Nasiba Ruben pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The trial court found the evidence was sufficient to find Ruben guilty, but deferred finding her guilty and placed her on community supervision for three years. The State subsequently filed a motion to revoke Ruben's unadjudicated community supervision. Ruben pled "true" to one alleged violation of the terms of her community supervision. The trial court found that Ruben violated the conditions of her community supervision, found her guilty, and orally pronounced a sentence of ten years of confinement. We note that although the trial court orally pronounced a sentence of ten years, the judgment recites that the trial court sentenced Ruben to three years of confinement. The judgment, including the sentence assessed, is the written declaration and embodiment of the oral pronouncement, and when there is a conflict, the oral pronouncement controls. Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). However, the parties do not complain on appeal of the discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the judgment; in fact, both parties' briefs simply recite that the trial court sentenced Ruben to ten years of confinement. Upon reviewing the record and discovering the discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the judgment, we requested responses from the parties, and both parties agreed in their responses that the oral pronouncement controls.

Ruben's appellate counsel filed a brief that presents counsel's professional evaluation of the record and concludes the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). On April 30, 2009, we granted an extension of time for appellant to file a pro se brief. We received no response from the appellant. We reviewed the appellate record, and we agree with counsel's conclusion that no arguable issues support the appeal. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief the appeal. Compare Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). This Court has the authority to reform the trial court's judgment to correct a clerical error. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Therefore, in the section of the judgment entitled "Punishment and Place of Confinement[,]" we delete the number "3" and substitute the number "10" in its place. We affirm the trial court's judgment as reformed. ⁽¹⁾

AFFIRMED AS REFORMED.

_________________________________

CHARLES KREGER

Justice

Submitted on August 11, 2009

Opinion Delivered October 14, 2009

Do not publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Gaultney and Kreger, JJ.

1. Appellant may challenge our decision in this case by filing a petition for discretionary review. See Tex. R. App. P. 68.