Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 2010

Lewis LaPaul Fulsom and Pauline Fulsom, as Next of Friend v. Mexia Independent School District

Lewis LaPaul Fulsom and Pauline Fulsom, as Next of Friend v. Mexia Independent School District
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas · Decided September 22, 2010

Lewis LaPaul Fulsom and Pauline Fulsom, as Next of Friend v. Mexia Independent School District

Opinion

 

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

 

No. 10-10-00041-CV

 

Lewis LaPaul Fulsom and Pauline

Fulsom, as Next OF Friend,

                                                                                    Appellants

 v.

 

Mexia Independent School District,

                                                                                    Appellee

 

 


From the 87th District Court

Limestone County, Texas

Trial Court No. 29,040-B

 

MEMORANDUM  Opinion


 

            Lewis LaPaul Fulsom and his mother, Pauline Fulsom, filed a lawsuit in May of 2009 against various entities and individuals.  After being issued a criminal trespass warning, which prohibited Fulsom from entering on Mexia Independent School District property, Fulsom amended his petition and sued MISD for abuse of process.  MISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction contending it was immune from Fulsom’s abuse of process claim.  The plea was granted, and Fulsom appeals.  We affirm.

            Whether a pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo.  Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).

            While sovereign immunity refers to the immunity from suit and liability of the State and the various divisions of state government, governmental immunity protects political subdivisions of the State, including school districts.  See Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n.3 (Tex. 2003); Huntsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Briggs, 262 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. denied).  For school districts, the Texas Tort Claims Act’s waiver of governmental immunity is narrow, encompassing only tort claims involving the use or operation of motor vehicles.  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.051 (Vernon 2005); Mission Consolidated, 253 S.W.3d at 656; Briggs, 262 S.W.3d at 392.  Further, governmental units are immune from intentional torts.  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.057 (Vernon 2005).

            Fulsom sued MISD for abuse of process, which is an intentional tort.  See Dillard's, Inc. v. Newman, 299 S.W.3d 144 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. denied); Harris v. Francis, No. 05-99-00866-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 1067 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 16, 2000, no pet.).  Because the Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive immunity for intentional torts, MISD was entitled to immunity.  Further, because Fulsom did not allege that his claim against MISD involved the use or operation of a motor vehicle, MISD was entitled to immunity.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting MISD’s plea to the jurisdiction. 

 

            The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

 

                                                                        TOM GRAY

                                                                        Chief Justice

 

Before Chief Justice Gray,

            Justice Reyna, and

            Justice Davis

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed September 22, 2010

[CV06]

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