ailed to produce any evidence of "a high degree of mental pain and distress" and that the evidence showed nothing more than "mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger," which would not support an award for mental anguish. Id.

      We will not reproduce the evidence relating to the award of mental anguish, which is detailed in our original opinion. Suffice it to say, however, that Claudette produced direct evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of her mental anguish, both in the form of her own testimony and that of psychiatrist Dr. Ricardo Schack. Dr. Schack's expert testimony, in particular, added additional weight to Claudette's testimony about the existence, nature, duration, and severity of her mental anguish. Moreover, the extraordinary and egregious nature of the disturbing event, i.e., essentially being accused by Dr. Griffith of complicity in her husband's death, is a quantum leap ahead of the event in Woodruff—merely having one's house flooded. Id. at 445 & n.10. Surely, such an allegation is reasonably calculated to produce a high degree of mental pain and distress and something more than the mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger that attends the ordinary vicissitudes of life.

      Because the record contains some direct evidence of the degree of mental anguish that will support a recovery, we adhere to our original ruling on British American's legal-sufficiency point. Considering the record as a whole, we likewise refuse to alter our ruling on the evidence's factual sufficiency. Unlike the jury in Woodruff, the jury here was not left to speculate on the existence of compensable mental anguish. Id. at 444. We deny British

American's motion for a rehearing.

                                                                               PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Thomas,

      Justice Cummings, and

      Justice Vance

Motion for rehearing denied

Opinion issued and filed February 14, 1996

Do not publish