IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-11-00059-CR

No. 10-11-00065-CR

William Johnson,

                                                                                    Appellant

 v.

The State of Texas,

                                                                                    Appellee

From the 12th District Court

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. 25,164 and 25,166

William Johnson filed a pro se notice of appeal in each of the two underlying criminal actions complaining of the written order of the trial court’s failure to provide a speedy trial.  The notices state that they are “interlocutory appeals,” and attached to them are Johnson’s pro se motions for speedy trial that were allegedly filed in the trial court.[1]  The notices do not identify a written order on Johnson’s motions, nor do they identify an underlying pretrial habeas corpus proceeding.

In letters dated March 8, 2011 and March 10, 2011 letter, we notified Johnson that these causes were subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction because it appeared that this Court does not have jurisdiction of his appeals of the trial court’s alleged interlocutory rulings.  See Abbott v. State, 271 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (standard for determining jurisdiction is not whether appeal is precluded by law, but whether appeal is authorized by law); Everett v. State, 91 S.W.3d 386, 386 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (stating that this court has jurisdiction over criminal appeals only when expressly granted by law).  We warned Johnson that we would dismiss these appeals unless, within 21 days, he showed grounds for continuing them.  Johnson has not filed a response showing grounds for continuing these appeals or that we have jurisdiction, nor is there any indication that Johnson is appealing the trial court’s judgment or order in a pretrial habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 31 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals for want of jurisdiction.

REX D. DAVIS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed April 6, 2011

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        This appeal concerns a conviction for misdemeanor driving while intoxicated.  See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon 2003).  We will affirm.

      Appellant raises four issues.  In Appellant’s first and second issues, she contends that the trial court erred in overruling Appellant’s motion to suppress the arresting officer’s “observations and opinions.”  In Appellant’s third and fourth issues, she contends that the trial court erred in overruling Appellant’s motion to suppress a video recording of Appellant.  In Appellant’s first and third issues, she argues that the officer did not have probable cause for arrest.  In Appellant’s second and fourth issues, she argues that her warrantless arrest did not fall within an exception to the warrant requirement.  We will overrule Appellant’s issues.

      Appellant does not contest that she was intoxicated.  Appellant argues that there is no evidence of the time at which she drove her car into a parked pickup truck, and no evidence of the time at which the officer arrived on the scene; and thus no evidence that Appellant was intoxicated when she caused the collision.  When the officer arrived in response to the collision, the ambulance and paramedics, firemen, and eyewitnesses were still present.  Under the totality of the circumstances, under the undisputed facts, the officer had reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that Appellant drove her car while intoxicated.  See Dyar v. State, 125 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 536 (2003); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  Thus, the officer had probable cause to arrest Appellant for driving while intoxicated.  See id.  Accordingly, Appellant’s first and third issues are overruled.  Moreover, under the totality of the circumstances, Appellant’s apprehension at the scene of and near the time of the collision made that scene a “suspicious place.”  See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004); Dyar at 468.  Thus, Appellant’s arrest fell within Article 14.03’s exception to the warrant requirement.  See id.  Accordingly, Appellant’s second and fourth issues are
overruled.  Having overruled Appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

      Justice Vance, and

      Justice Reyna

(Justice Vance concurs with a note. It is hard to understand why the majority will not provide, even in a memorandum opinion, either the basic facts necessary to understand why the Appellant brought the issues or our reasons for rejecting them.  Here, the majority simply says Appellant was apprehended “at the scene of and near the time of” the collision.  It is undisputed that Appellant was found in a nearby apartment; it is the apartment that the State says was a “suspicious place.”  Left unstated is Appellant’s contention that the State did not prove the time that elapsed between the collision and Appellant’s arrest, and that the State says it could have been up to 42 minutes.  Thus, in each instance the majority has not addressed the issues brought by Appellant in light of the facts revealed by the record.)

Opinion delivered and filed September 22, 2004

Affirmed

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