Robert Charles Edwards Jr. A/K/A Rob Edwards v. State

NUMBERS 13-11-00419-CR 13-11-00420-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

ROBERT CHARLES EDWARDS JR. A/K/A ROB EDWARDS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 252nd District Court of Jefferson County, Texas. MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Benavides

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez1 Appellant, Robert Charles Edwards Jr. a/k/a Rob Edwards, pleaded guilty to the offense of possession of less than one gram of cocaine, a state jail felony, in appellate cause number 13-11-00419-CR, see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a), (b) (West 2010); see also id. § 481.102(3)(D) (West 2010), and burglary of a habitation, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (West 2003), in appellate cause number 13-11-00420- CR. Pursuant to an agreed punishment recommendation, for the offense of possession of a controlled substance, the trial court sentenced Edwards to confinement in state jail for a term of two years, suspended the sentence, and placed Edwards on community supervision for a term of four years and assessed a $500.00 fine. For the offense of burglary of a habitation, the trial court deferred adjudication and placed Edwards on community supervision for ten years.

The State then filed a motion to revoke alleging that Edwards had violated the terms of his community supervision. After hearing evidence, the trial court found that Edwards violated three terms of his community supervision, revoked Edwards’s community supervision, found him guilty of the offenses of possession of cocaine and of burglary of a habitation. For the offense of possession of a controlled substance, the trial court assessed punishment of confinement in the state jail for two years, and for the burglary of a habitation offense, the trial court assessed punishment of confinement for fifteen years. The sentences are to run concurrently. The trial court certified Edwards’s right to appeal, and this appeal followed. We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), Edwards’s appellate counsel has filed a brief with this Court stating that after diligently reviewing the record and researching the law, she has found no reversible error committed by the trial court and no arguable grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. Although counsel’s brief does not advance any arguable grounds of error, it does present a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (AIn Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance >arguable= points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.@) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), Edwards’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there are no errors in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that she has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal; (2) served copies of the brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw on Edwards; and (3) informed Edwards of his right to review the record and to file a pro se response.2 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. On November 14, 2011, this Court received Edwards’s pro se response.3 See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record, counsel’s brief, and Edwards’s pro se response, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (ADue to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.@); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, Edwards’s attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (AIf an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.@) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motions to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of the opinion and judgments to Edwards and advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.4 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).